Text Version


          (2) Renders an AXIS advance southward into EGYPT or 
    eastward into the LEVANT impossible as long as the UNITED 
    NATIONS hold CRETE.
     (3) Has a beneficial moral effect on TURKEY.
     (4) Is a step towards opening the AEGEAN.
     (5) Acquires air bases for:
                 (a) Strategic bombing operations as far north as 
     PLOESTI and the DANUBE.
                 (b) Land-based fighter support for landing opera-
     tions against the DODECANESE and the PELEPONNESUS. 
     (6) Encourages subversive activities in the BALKANS. 
     (7) Contains present German Air Forces in the BALKANS 
    and might cause diversion of additional units from the Russian Front.
           (8) Permits operations against the AXIS lines of com-
    munication through the AEGEAN. 
    b. Disadvantages.
          (1) Is a difficult amphibious operation out of effective 
    tactical range of land-based UNITED NATIONS fighter air-
    craft.
          (2) Is impossible to advance into the BALKANS without 
    additional amphibious operations in the face of strong 
    AXIS opposition.
          (3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of 
    ITALY.
          4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic 
    plans, nor provide any substantial diversion of strength 
    from the Russian Front. 
 
    c. Pertinent remarks.
       A direct assault on CRETE would be an expensive opera-
tion. Even though an invasion of EUROPE via the AEGEAN and 
GREECE were envisaged, the results to be obtained would not 
be commensurate with the cost. This is true since an in-
vasion of the BALKANS via GREECE could be mounted from
SICILY, thus eliminating the necessity of an operation 
against CRETE and/or the DODECANESE.                      
 
                                           -2-
 
 
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