8.
 
reserves of food, men, supplies and fuel. He thinks that
we may be under-estimating Germany's oil supplies, and he 
bases this on the fact that under the two-year agreement 
they had with Germany, the Germans asked for less fuel than 
the agreement provided for during the year 1940-41. He 
thought one weakness the British had was under-rating their 
enemy; he did not propose to do this. He xxxxx thinks that 
so far as men, supplies, food and fuel are concerned, 
the German Army is capable of taking part-in a Winter 
campaign in Russia. He thinks however, that it would be 
difficult for the Germans to operate offensively much after 
the l st September, when the heavy rains will begin, and 
after 0ctober 1st the ground would be so bad that they 
would have to go en the defensive. He expressed great 
confidence that the line during the Winter months would be 
in front of Moscow, Kiev aud Leningrad - probably net more 
than 100 kilometres away from where it is now. He thinks 
that one of the great advantages the Russian Army has at 
the moment is that the Germans "are tired" and have  no 
stomach for an offensive. He realises that Germany can
still bring up about 40 divisions, making 2500 divisions in
all at the Russian front, but these divisions probably cannot 
get there before the hard weather sets in.
               He told me that the first need of the Russian Army 
was light anti-aircraft guns, 20 mm., 25 mm., 37 mm., and 
50 mm., and that they need vast quantities of these guns to 
give protection to their lines of communications against low 
flying planes.
            His second great need was aluminium needed in the 
construction of airplanes.
            The third was machine guns of approximately 50 
calibre, and the fourth rifles of approximately 30 calibre. 
He stated that he needed large anti-aircraft guns for the 
defence of cities. In his opinion the Russian supply of 
ammunition was satisfactory. He stated the outcome of the 
war in Russia would largely depend on the ability to enter