Subject:  The necessity of the three principal 
               Allies arriving at a common political 
               program for liberated countries.
 
     Although the principal Allies have been able to
work out a generally satisfactory coordination of mili-
tary strategy and operations in the prosecution of the 
war against Germany, there has been no such coordination 
in regard to political policies. Recent events in Europe 
have demonstrated the very real danger not only to Allied 
unity during the war but to the hope of a stable peace, 
as a result of the failure of the Allies to evolve an 
agreed and mutually acceptable political program.
 
   Growing evidence of Anglo-Soviet rivalry on the con-
tinent of Europe and the resulting power politics scramble 
for position is due less to the difficulties over terri-
torial questions than to the question of the political 
character of the governments in various countries of 
Europe beyond the Soviet borders. On the one hand, it 
is evident that the Soviet Government suspects that Great 
Britain desires to see installed wherever possible right-
wing governments which from the Soviet point of view 
would be hostile to the Soviet Union. On the other hand,
the British view with apprehension the possibility that 
the Soviet Government will endeavor in its turn to install 
and support left-wing totalitarian governments as far west 
as possible in Europe.
 
        In actual fact these mutual suspicions appear to be 
unjustified in that it is not a fixed and calculated 
British policy to support right-wing elements in Europe, 
nor on the basis of existing evidence can it be said 
that the Soviet Government is determined to install Com-
munist regimes throughout Europe. However, these inter-
acting mutual suspicions tend to push British policy, in 
action, farther to the right and Soviet policy farther to 
the left. Recent events in Greece will undoubtedly be 
widely interpreted in Moscow as confirmation of their 
suspicions of Great Britain's intentions, and the recent 
events in Poland with the formation of the Lublin Commit-
tee into a provisional government will likewise confirm 
British fears in regard to Soviet policy.
 
                              If