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     The Department of State proposes this solution of an extremely
difficult frontier problem as the one representing in the light
of present circumstances the most equitable settlement and the
one offering the best promise of international tranquility in
eastern Europe. It is realized, however, that there may well be
strong pressure for the acquistion by Poland of a still larger
portion of German territory. If this is the case it is not
believed that it would be feasible for the United States to oppose
such a proposal.
 
     The solution just recommended would mean the addition for
Poland of an area of about 21,000 square miles containing approx-
imately 4,200,000 inhabitants. The Polish-German frontier north
of Upper Silesia would be straightened and shortened by 130 miles.
Poland's sea coast would be lengthened to some 200 miles with
adequate port familities in Gdynia and Danzig. The annexation of
Upper Silesia would substantially strengthen Poland's industrial 
resources and would make possible a unified and rationalized
operation of the greater Upper Silesian district.
 
     Because of the importation of this question, a special study
of it, prepared in the Department, is attached.
 
B. The Transfer of German Minorities
 
     The cessions to Poland recommended above would bring under
Polish sovereignty approximately 3,400,000 Germans in addition to
more than 700,000 resident there before the present war. Both
the Polish Government-in-exile and the Lublin Committee have
expressed the desire to expel this German population. In addition
the Government-in-exile of Czechoslavakia wishes to remove more
than 1,500,000 Sudeten Germans.
 
     During the final stages of war, and during the early post-war
period, it is the belief of the Department of State that an 
indiscriminate expulsion of so many people would add enormously
to the confusion likely to exist in that area, threatening the
public health of much of Europe and jeopardizing the peace and
good order of the continent. Nevertheless, it is not considered
that it would be expedient for the United States to oppose such
general transfers if they are insisted upon by the Czechoslo-
vakian and Polish governments having the support of the British
and Soviet governments. The Department of State believes, how-
ever, that in so far as possible this government should endeavor 
to obtain agreement on selected transfer of those portions of
the German minority from Poland and Czechoslovakia whose transfer
would contribute to the improvement of relations between the
countries concerned and to a greater stability in that part of
Europe. The Department favors a policy whereby these transfers
would be held to a minimum, would take place gradually in an
orderly manner and under international auspices agreed upon by
                              the