5. After the withdrawal from Greece, the three commanders-
 
in-chief voted not to attempt to hold Crete. Orders arrived from London
 
that the island was to be held.
 
     6. A conference was held on May 13 of the Army, Navy and
 
Air comanders. It was the sentiment of all that the fleet would maintain
 
the security of the sea flanks without fail and that "the present strength
 
of the R.A.F., six Hurricanes, was to be added to by ten Blenheim pursuit
 
planes if procurable."
 
     7. The air force made no promise in regard to material
 
assistance. However, as the German air operations grew, planes were
 
tragically necessary and both at sea and ashore there were wild demands
 
for fighter protection. No such planes were available for service.
 
Nevertheless, the lack of them was availed of to alibi the Cretan disaster.
 
                              FELLERS
 
                    PART II
 
     1. Admiral Cunningham, commanding the Mediterranean Fleet
 
has no very high opinion of the operation of the air force during the
 
battle for Crete. Now that it is over, he estimates at its proper weight
 
the importance of air strength, and has ordered to England by plane Lord
 
Louis Mountbatten, the King' s cousin and the former commander of the
 
sunken KELLEY (destroyer), with the mission of gaining a personal audience
 
with King George to inform him that if 1,000 planes are not immediately
 
received, the Middle East cannot be held. General Wavell recently wired
 
the Prime Minister that the War Cabinet must contain at least one man who
 
is conscious of the fact that the British have other lines to hold than
 
those which center in London.
 
     2. After the evacuation from Crete, there arose a serious
 
 
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