mission.
 
     4. Prior to the defeat in Crete such a general, commanding
 
the Middle East, knowing that the retention of the Island necessitated
 
air forces which he did not himself have at hand, would have either
 
obtained a sufficient number of squadrons for the defense or he would
 
have been well situated to refuse to attempt the impossible. Recognizing
 
that a withdrawal from Crete could only be effected with ship casualties
 
beyond all precedent, he would have at once demanded of the War Office
 
sufficient forces or he would have executed the withdrawal in time to
 
avoid the losses. A shrewd commander-in-chief of the Middle East would 
 
attempt joint operations in one event only; that he had under his
 
control a balanced force which premised a fair opportunity of success.
 
     5. If personal responsibility for Middle Eastern activities
 
attached to one officer, he would delegate such responsibility from top
 
to bottom of the chain of command. Immediate reaction would be to
 
energize all ranks for in the event of failure all ranks would risk
 
being relieved.
 
                                   FELLERS
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   -4-