SECRET
 
The latter course of action is the less acceptable
 
because of the unfavorable terrain, logistical difficulties,
 
limitations to furnishing adequate air support, and diversion
 
of air forces from the bomber offensive from the UNITED KING-
 
DOM.
 
29. In the PACIFIC and FAR EAST, the UNITED NATIONS can in
 
1943- 1944.
 
     a.  Maintain pressure against JAPAN, retaining the initia-
 
tire, attaining positions of readiness for a full-scale of-
 
fensive against JAPAN, and keeping CHINA in the war, with
 
such forces as are allocated for the purpose.
 
     b. Furnish supplies and limited air support to CHINA.
 
     c. Increase attrition of Japanese shipping, air, and naval resources.
 
     d. Undertake naval operations in the PACIFIC against
 
Japanese shipping and positions at an increasing rate and
 
intensity.
 
     e. Maintain Allied lines of communication.
 
30. If CHINA is eliminated from the war.
 
     If CHINA is eliminated as an active ally, the UNITED 
 
NATIONS will be deprived of the most promising sites from which
 
to conduct an air offensive against JAPAN, the obligation to free
 
CHINA from Japanese control will become an added burden, and the
 
 
defeat of JAPAN may be delayed for years.
 
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