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British navy in eastern waters the ratio is more favorable to Germany
than would appear at first sight. Furthermore, England's action,
independent of France, may be viewed as a diminution of French prestige
and a corresponding gain in German prestige.
 
 
It will be recalled that rapprochement with England has ever been one
of the fundamentals of Hitler's doctrine of foreign policy.*
 
 
1 (c). One of the first fruits of the attainment of armed power was the
reoccupation of the Rhineland beginning March 7, 1936. Even more
important than as another blow at the Treaty of Versailles, was the
effect of this action in two other directions. First, French prestige
was vitally impaired in that with the decision of the French general
staff not to take military action against Germany, it became apparent
to all that France was no longer prepared to take up arms on every
major provocation, and in that her allies may well have taken note that
France would think twice before deciding affirmatively on what really
constituted a casus belli. The action on March 7th shut off France from
her eastern allies
 
 
 
 *1. MEIN KAMPF, pages 154 (Germany and England against Russia); 699
(alliance with England desirable); 701 (divergence of British and
Jewish interests).
                                                            
 
                                                            
 
2. Embassy despatch No. 2085, of June 26, 1935.
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