Germany and most likely to be affected by a potentially dangerous situation. In the event of an attack on Poland or Rumania there would be good reasons on the merits of the case for trying to secure some measure of Soviet participation. We believe that even the benevolent neutrality of the Soviet would be to the advantage of these two countries in case of war and that they might indeed be grateful in an emergency to have at their disposal such war material as the Soviet industry would be in a position to furnish. We are disposed in the first place to ascertain the views of the Soviet Government as to their likely attitude to this market. It is important not to reinforce their tendency towards isolation and we propose to consider in due course how best to retain their close interest which is after all to their own general advantage. It is essential of course that the present approach to the Polish and Rumanian Governments should be kept secret as well as any negotiations that may follow it. Once however agreement has been secured it would be necessary for constitutional reasons that some statement should be made in Parliament. His Majesty's Government would at any rate have to state in public the assurances which they had given to the Polish and Rumanian Governments. It is possible that, |