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freedom from one front to another. The chief factors influencing
Japanese strategy at present appear to be (A) time, (B) the attitude
of RUSSIA. JAPAN must obtain quick results in view of her difficult
economic situation and the inevitability of defeat, if the UNITED
STATES and ourselves are given time in which to build up our
strength against her. She is also anxious not to start another
front in the North, whilst fighting is still in progress on the
Southern and CHINA front. It therefore appears that after the
initial phases of the war are over, the position of JAPAN, who
has now been at war for over four years in CHINA, will become
precarious if operations are opened on her Northern front, and
if there is sufficient time for the UNITED STATES and ourselves
to strengthen our military position in the FAR EAST.
BURMA.
C. in C. INDIA included BURMA in his Command
as from 15th December.
RUSSIA.
The Germans in their retreat are suffering
heavy casualties and loss of equipment and it is clear that in
some sectors they are being severely harassed and prevented from
withdrawing according to plan. Particularly Northwest of MOSCOW,
where they have lost KALININ and in the TULA sector, where they
had to fall back 60 miles. In the South they still hold TAGANROG
and have not retired West of the River MIUS. There is no evidence
that any divisions have yet been pulled out for refitting.
(III)
AIR OPERATIONS
UNITED KINGDOM
. A slight improvement in the weather enabled
our night bombing to be resumed on a fairly heavy scale. BREST
was attacked on six nights by a total of 167 aircraft which dropped
277 tons of H.E. Although intense darkness and efficient smoke
screens prevented accurate bombing results appeared hopeful.
It is estimated that about 13,000 tons of enemy shipping were
sunk or damaged by our aircraft.
MEDITERRANEAN
. In spite of sandstorms and inferior
weather conditions the retreating enemy was given no respite.
By % day, our light bombers and fighters helped our ground operations
by directing frequent and intense attacks chiefly upon M.T. concentrated
and retiring on roads and on aerodromes. Since the enemy had
lost at least six forward aerodromes, there was a certain amount
of congestion on those in the BENGHAOI area. Full advantage was
taken of this situation by our bombers and fighter-bombers. Transport
aircraft flying between CRETE and DERNA to relieve the difficult
sea route, were also the object of special attack. Heavy night-bombing
raids were directed upon the main ports used by the enemy both
in AFRICA and Southern ITALY. Our aircraft sank or damaged about
15,000