Submitted a memorandum to the State Department, the Lend-Lease
Administration and the American Treasury on our balances and
on our liabilities, asking the American Government to recognize
that, in view of our growing external liabilities which arose
directly from the war, the position of our balances should, not
be regarded as open to criticism. This view received strong support
in some of the American Departments, though not in all. Mr. Stettinius
and the State Department are wholly convinced that, in the circumstances,
there should be no reduction of Lend-Lease, and that this small
mitigation of our growing indebtedness should be allowed to accrue
to us. The Lend-Lease Administration (at any rate before they
were merged in the new body) were of the same opinion. The U.S.
Treasury, on the other hand, has been taking a sticky line, for
reasons which have never been explained to us. They have shown
disinclination to discuss the matter with any of our representatives
or to give any reasons.
Some elements in the Administration maintain tat Congress
was given to understand the Lend-Lease was only to apply to the
extent which the recipient countries were utterly unable to pay
for imports, whether of food or military equipment. In other
words, however great our liabilities, we are not entitled to
Lend-Lesse as long as we have a dollar in the till. This view
might have been sustainable in some quarters before Pearl Harbor.
But it is, of course, utterly contrary to the principle of the
pooling of resources between Allies, and also to the principle
that the most convenient supplier shall provide the materials,
irrespective of financial liability.
Moreover, it is a doctrine apparently to be applied to us
only, for no such suggestion has been made to Russia. Nor, of
course, do we apply it in giving reciprocal aim to the Americans
or to any other country.