-- 2 --
 
transport, as withdrawal of our forces could not reasonably be made without giving the white
population an opportunity of coming away.    The problem of safe sea passage for the garrison
and civilians is no less acute than that considered in paragraph 2. above in dealing with the
question of reinforcing the garrison. The psychological effect which a voluntary withdrawal would
have on the minds of the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies must also be borne in mind. We
therefore recommend that the existing garrison be retained at Rabaul. In making this
recommendation we desire to emphasise the fact that the scale of attack which can be brought
against Rabaul from bases in Japanese mandated islands is beyond the capacity of the small
garrison to meet successfully. Notwithstanding this we consider it essential to maintain a forward
air observation line as long as possible and to make the enemy fight for this line rather than
abandon it at the first threat.
 
4. The situation will be under constant review, and
 
if United States cruisers and destroyers by any chance are obliged to fall back on Darwin (which
may be a possibility) sufficient combined naval forces may become available to reinforce and
supply Rabaul.
 
(2) New Caledonia.
 
Occupation of New Caledonia by the Japanese would deny to the naval and air forces of the
Associated Powers a link in a chain of communications and a valuable base for the production of
sea communications. Further, it is most important to deny to Japan the nickel deposits of New
Caledonia.