JOINT BOARD ESTIMATE OF
                UNITED STATES OVER-ALL PRODUCTION
                          REQUIREMENTS.
 
III. PROBABLE CHARACTER OF THE ENEMY'S MAJOR STRATEGY:
     (A)  GERMAN STRATEGY: 16.  C.  (Cont'd)
 
          the Black Sea.  Success may depend upon whether or not a large concentration of          
British and Russian defensive forces are available, and upon the continued military       capacity of
Italy, now an uncertain quantity.
 
       d.   The occupation of Spain, Portugal, Morocco,   French West Africa, Senegal, and        
the Atlantic Islands, for the purpose of   strengthening the German offensive against       British
shipping, and for denying those positions to Germany's enemies.  Considerable land, air, and naval
forces will be required for this offensive, though not so great as would be required for conquest of
the lands to the eastward of the Mediterranean.
 
     17.  In and near her own home territory, Germany can exert her full effort.  As her
forces move away from the home base, the effort that can be exerted at the point of military
contact becomes reduced in proportion to the length and security of the lines of communication,
and to the difficulties of transportation.  Germany is experiencing these difficulties in Russia; she
would experience them in an even greater degree in an offensive in the regions to the east of the
Mediterranean; while the problem of the support of strong forces in Morocco, French West
Africa, Senegal, and the Azores would be very great indeed.  In the eastern part of European
Russia, in Egypt, Irak, Iran, and North and West Africa, the effort that German military forces
exert is only a fraction of what they have been able to put forth in France, the Balkans, and
Poland.  Severe German defeats in these regions might readily affect the stability of the Nazi
regime.  This significant possibility should be taken into account in the development of the
strategy of the Associated Powers.
 
 
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