U. S.
BRITISH
 
strength of forces in that area is insufficient to maintain that defensive position.
     After providing immediate reinforcements for defense, and as  additional forces become
available, it will become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct an
all-out offensive against Japan. Accordinsly although our operations in the near future must be
primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future
offensive.
3.        The general strategic policy should therefore be:-
     (a)  To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java,
North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the Far East, Area, and to operate air and sea
forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to popose the Japanese
southward advance.
     (b)  To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Far East
Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defense of India.
     (c)  To re-establish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippines'
Garrison.
     (d)  To maintain communications to Burma and Australia, and to and within the Far
East Area.
     (e)  To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible supplies to relieve
shipping requirements.
Forces and Reinforcements.
4.   The estimated strength of forces initially in the Area, and the reinforcements ordered or
planned to be sent are shown in the attached tables (Annexes I, II, and III).  Future
reinforcements should be planned in accordance with approved strategic policy, having due regard
to the essential requirements of other theatres.
 
                               -2-
 
and to and v~thin the Far East Area.
 
(e) To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all
o
 
possible supplies to relieve shipping re~ uirements.
 
Forces and ke~,zorcemen s
.... _ .        ,    ,, .- . .
 
/4..          The est~'~m, ted stren-~th o.f forces initially in the Area, and.
the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent are shc~;~n in the attaehed tables (Annexes T,
II, and Iii). Future reinforcements should be planned in accordance ,~th a9proved strategic policy,
havi~ due
 
regard to the esseatial requirements of other theatres.
 
-2-
 
RE
 
r