made to control the central and eastern Mediterranean and to maintain and exploit the position in
North Africa.
     3.   This Committee's views regarding other hypotheses may be stated briefly as
follows:
          a.   An operation through North African ports against Egypt from the west:
Likely as a subsidiary undertaking, but not as the major effort.  See paragraph 2.
          b.   An operaiton through the Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French
North Africa: To be undertaken only if necessary to counter an Allied initiative in that region.
          c.   A thrust through Turkey to Syria and thence to Egypt or Iraq: Unlikely.
          d.   Invasion of the British Isles: Most unlikely.
     4.   The considerations from which these conclusions are reached may be indicated by
comment, seriatim, on the paragrahps of the British appreciation.
          (1)  While it is known that the German oil supply is strictly limited, it is
believedt hat it is sufficient to meet the needs of military operations through 1941 at least.  The
Military Intelligence Division's estimate of German air strength is as follows:
 
               Total aircraft in tactical groups            5094
 
               In operaitonal training units                2097
 
               In schools                                                       1498
 
               In reserve                                                            4195
 
               In civil repair                                                  2097
 
               Total except transport                  14981
 
               Transport                                                        1700
 
               Total aircraft strength of G.H.F.                 16681
 
These figures seem reasonable. They are 20 to 24 percent higher than those given in the British
appreciation.
     (2) Agreed.
 
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