Army
 
General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces
and Chief of Staff
Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air .Forces and
Deputy Chief of Staff
Brigadier General L.T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division Brigadier
General D. D. Eisenhower, General Staff Corps
 
Joint Secretaries
 
Colonel E. I. C. Jacob
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations Lieut. Colonel
P.M. Robinert, G-2. GHQ, U.S.A.
Major W, T, Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S.
 
1.        WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES MARINES FROM ICELAND.
 
                 ADMIRAL STARK said that he was very anxious to
withdraw the 4,500 U. S. Marines from Iceland as soon as possible, as
they were urgently needed for other tasks, He hoped that this could be
arranged even at the risk of delay in the relief of British troops.
 
                  MARSHAL DILL agreed as to the importance of
withdrawing the Marines. He suggested that the local Commanders might
be instructed to draw up the
best possible plan for arranging this withdrawal as early as possible.
He would telegraph to England to give the necessary instructions.
 
                 ADMIRAL STARK said that the details of what was
required could-be furnished by Brigadier General Gerow.
 
                 It was agreed that the withdrawal of the 4,500 U.S.
Marines now serving in Iceland should be arranged as soon as possible
and SIR JOHN DILL undertook to telegraph the necessary instructions to
England on receipt of the details of what was required from Brigadier
General Gerow.
 
                                                            
          2.        AMERICAN-BRITISH STRATEGY. -
                                                 considered a revised
version, prepared by the U.S.
Chiefs of Staff, of the Memorandum on American-British Strategy. (WW-1,
U.S. Revised)  The various amendments proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of
Staff
were considered, and with a few exceptions were agreed to, it was also
decided that the lists of sea and air bases contained in Paragraph 12
should be omitted. It was further agreed that the paper should be
circulated only to the United States and British Chiefs of Staff and
their immediate subordinates, and that a note should be inserted in the
paper to this effect.