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                   GENERAL MARSHALL said that he did not think it would be necessary to do more
than cut down the strength of the convoy which was shortly due to sail for Magnet, to
approximately 10,000 men. The ships required for the Pacific move would have to be of a certain
type in order to manage the long sea passage.
 
            ADMIRAL KING inquired whether, if the North Atlantic convoy were cut
    so as to release personnel ships to carry 10,000 men, tile urgent Pacific moves could then be
accomplished.
 
                  GENERAL MARSHALL said that it would accommodate three anti-aircraft
regiments badly needed in the ABDA Area; that it was not only a question of personnel ships;
freight ships would also be required. That the basic problem was to accelerate movements
requiring three months to consummate, into one month; those contemplated withill tile next few
weeks to be undertaken within the next two weeks; that time- even days- is the pressing factor.
 
After further discussion it was agreed that the problem should be put forthwith to the British and
American shipping experts, and the following terms of reference were approved:-
 
"To make proposals for providing shipping from United States and British resources to carry to
the ABDA Area the urgent reinforcements of men and materiel which the United States Army
wishes to send ill the immediate future; and to show at what cost to other commitments this
shipping can be found."
 
                  The above terms of reference were conveyed without delay to General Somervell,
U.S. Army, and to Brigadier Napier, British Army, for innnediate action.
 
                  GENERAL GEBOW left the Conference in order to be present at the discussion.
 
          3.        ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND.
 
THE CONFERENCE had before them a report by the Joint Planning Committee on the
establishment of United States Forces in Northern Ireland.
(U. S. ABe-4/7, British WW (J.P.C.) 7)
 
                    AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PORTAL referred to Paragraph 5 (c) (3) in which
it was stated that it would be the responsibility of the British to provide adequate air protection
and support for the United States field forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland.
He explained that the British forces in Northern Ireland were generally protected by our own
system
 
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