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exactly with the major frontal assaults in the South-west Pacific and South-east Asia which I
assume we shall make next summer. I may add that the proposed operations from China are a way
of doing much with little. They will require no premature diversion of essential forces from the
western front.
                  Unfortunately, since the abandonment of the plan for a major campaign in Burma, the
China program appears to consist exclusively of the Matterhorn Project, for long range bombing
of Japan. No additions to the program seem likely. The Chinese leaders, while I am sure they will
approve and cooperate in the operations which I suggest, are too preoccupied with domestic and
financial problems to take the initiative. I am glad to say that I was recently able to explain the
potentialities of an attack on Japanese shipping and air power to Lord Louis Mountbatten and
General Wedemeyer. They immediately grasped its importance, and have promised to support the
plan in the appropri ate quarters. But they are in no position to do over-all planning for China, and
an over-all plan is required.
                     I am not only convinced long range bombing of Japan is less immediately important
than the attack on shipping and air power; I also believe that as now planned, the Matterhorn
Project is tactically dangerous, and that the proposed division of command of the Matterhorn Pro-
ject and the Fourteenth Air Force is militarily unsound. The whole weight of my experience in
China is on the side of these conclusions. As you know, I have always maintained that properly
conducted air defense by an adequate force could enable the Chinese Armies to beat back any
Japanese counter-offensive. But if the present plan for the Matterhorn Project, and itscommand is
adhered to, I cannot feel the same confidence on this point. I append a copy of a letter to General
Arnold, listing the defects in the Matterhorn Project, and a Plan of Air Operations for the attack
on shipping and air power.
                     Summarizing, the conditions of an effective flank attack on Japan from China are:
                     a. Recognition of such an attack as part of the broad strategy of the war;
              b. Augmentation of the Fourteenth Air Force;
                    c. Integration of the Matterhorn Project into the Fourteenth Air Force;
                    d. An energetic effort to improve supply facilities, and especially transport facilities,
within China;
                    e. Agreement with the Generalissimo respecting the proposed ground-air assault on
the upper Yangtsze positions.
All but e. are essential. Clearing the upper Yangtsze will be effective
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