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to say, they feel that recent events have shown that
the difference in strength between the major powers
(particularly of Western Europe) and the lesser powers
(especially in event of a combination anong certain
of then) is not as marked as it was in the pre-war days.
Indeed, according to my informants' opinion the Western
European powers have shown they are not in a mood to
fight. Subsequent analysis shows in effect they feel
they have all to lose and nothing to gain. On the other
hand,however,the lesser powers who do not enjoy the same
extent of economic and territorial contentment, have
less to lose and more to gain. This my informants state
is the mood in which most of the lesser states east of
Berlin are found today. Accordingly, the chances are
more favorable for their resisting a German attempt to
absorb them today than even before the recent crisis.
In fact, my informants feel that these lesser states
would henceforth be more apt to come to each others
assistance than hitherto.
Until tangible evidence of some practical formula
which might serve to turn the Munich proceedings into a
factor for future appeasement and pacification emerges,
statesmen in this part of Europe may be expected to regard
the current and near future period in the light of an
armed truce. Indeed, to my mind, if the statesmanship
and diplomacy of Europe fail to conceive of a basis of
a satisfactory readjustment and do not succeed in advancing
in rapid order a oractical formula looking to durable
European pacification, I feel that we may expect a
recrudescence of tension no later than the early days of March.
As for Poland's position at the moment, signs are
becoming increasingly evident of Poland' s dissatisfaction
over non-inclusion in the Munich conference (see my cables
no. 139, November 24, 1937, paragraph 11; no. 53, April
21, 10 A.M., Section I, paragraph 2, subparagraph d; no. 53, April
21, 10 A.M., Section II, paragraph 6; my cable
transmitted from London under date of March 8, 1938; and
no. 54, April 22, 11 A.M., wherein I pointed out that
one among other factors motivating Poland's earnest desire
for inclusion in a conference looking to a three, four,
or more power pact, (especially in the event of German
participation therein) is that Poland, aside from her
non-aggression pact with Germany, is apprehensive over the
fact that Germany has never declared her satisfaction
over