-2- freedom from one front to another. The chief factors influencing Japanese strategy at present appear to be (A) time, (B) the attitude of RUSSIA. JAPAN must obtain quick results in view of her difficult economic situation and the inevitability of defeat, if the UNITED STATES and ourselves are given time in which to build up our strength against her. She is also anxious not to start another front in the North, whilst fighting is still in progress on the Southern and CHINA front. It therefore appears that after the initial phases of the war are over, the position of JAPAN, who has now been at war for over four years in CHINA, will become precarious if operations are opened on her Northern front, and if there is sufficient time for the UNITED STATES and ourselves to strengthen our military position in the FAR EAST. BURMA. C. in C. INDIA included BURMA in his Command as from 15th December. RUSSIA. The Germans in their retreat are suffering heavy casualties and loss of equipment and it is clear that in some sectors they are being severely harassed and prevented from withdrawing according to plan. Particularly Northwest of MOSCOW, where they have lost KALININ and in the TULA sector, where they had to fall back 60 miles. In the South they still hold TAGANROG and have not retired West of the River MIUS. There is no evidence that any divisions have yet been pulled out for refitting. (III) AIR OPERATIONS UNITED KINGDOM . A slight improvement in the weather enabled our night bombing to be resumed on a fairly heavy scale. BREST was attacked on six nights by a total of 167 aircraft which dropped 277 tons of H.E. Although intense darkness and efficient smoke screens prevented accurate bombing results appeared hopeful. It is estimated that about 13,000 tons of enemy shipping were sunk or damaged by our aircraft. MEDITERRANEAN . In spite of sandstorms and inferior weather conditions the retreating enemy was given no respite. By % day, our light bombers and fighters helped our ground operations by directing frequent and intense attacks chiefly upon M.T. concentrated and retiring on roads and on aerodromes. Since the enemy had lost at least six forward aerodromes, there was a certain amount of congestion on those in the BENGHAOI area. Full advantage was taken of this situation by our bombers and fighter-bombers. Transport aircraft flying between CRETE and DERNA to relieve the difficult sea route, were also the object of special attack. Heavy night-bombing raids were directed upon the main ports used by the enemy both in AFRICA and Southern ITALY. Our aircraft sank or damaged about 15,000 |