Submitted a memorandum to the State Department, the Lend-Lease Administration and the American Treasury on our balances and on our liabilities, asking the American Government to recognize that, in view of our growing external liabilities which arose directly from the war, the position of our balances should, not be regarded as open to criticism. This view received strong support in some of the American Departments, though not in all. Mr. Stettinius and the State Department are wholly convinced that, in the circumstances, there should be no reduction of Lend-Lease, and that this small mitigation of our growing indebtedness should be allowed to accrue to us. The Lend-Lease Administration (at any rate before they were merged in the new body) were of the same opinion. The U.S. Treasury, on the other hand, has been taking a sticky line, for reasons which have never been explained to us. They have shown disinclination to discuss the matter with any of our representatives or to give any reasons. Some elements in the Administration maintain tat Congress was given to understand the Lend-Lease was only to apply to the extent which the recipient countries were utterly unable to pay for imports, whether of food or military equipment. In other words, however great our liabilities, we are not entitled to Lend-Lesse as long as we have a dollar in the till. This view might have been sustainable in some quarters before Pearl Harbor. But it is, of course, utterly contrary to the principle of the pooling of resources between Allies, and also to the principle that the most convenient supplier shall provide the materials, irrespective of financial liability. Moreover, it is a doctrine apparently to be applied to us only, for no such suggestion has been made to Russia. Nor, of course, do we apply it in giving reciprocal aim to the Americans or to any other country. |