conclusion of the present series of negotiations, the British lend-lease program could be stabilized in all major aspects until mid-Summer at least. 3. The question is more than one of embarrassment. The present British dollar balances must be considered as the only reserve for their growing financial commitments, especially in the Middle East and Far East. An ordering of their affairs which will reduce those holdings may gravely weaken their machinery of war finance. Against that back-ground, the balances do not seem too hi Furthermore, they have risen largely because of our troop expenditures, a source of dollars which may well decline after the next few months. If the British are to be able to cooperate with us in multilateral solutions of trade and financial problems, they must finish the war with enough assets to carry through such a program. Even as things stand now, it would be difficult for the British to consider unfreezing sterling at or near the end of the war, or giving up many of their other economic controls. If the financial side of the war is run in such a way as to keep British balances at or about $1 billion, we thereby reduce our chance to achieve the basic economic policy we want and n E.R. Stettinius, Jr. Attachment: Draft of letter from the President to the Prime Minister |