mission. 4. Prior to the defeat in Crete such a general, commanding the Middle East, knowing that the retention of the Island necessitated air forces which he did not himself have at hand, would have either obtained a sufficient number of squadrons for the defense or he would have been well situated to refuse to attempt the impossible. Recognizing that a withdrawal from Crete could only be effected with ship casualties beyond all precedent, he would have at once demanded of the War Office sufficient forces or he would have executed the withdrawal in time to avoid the losses. A shrewd commander-in-chief of the Middle East would attempt joint operations in one event only; that he had under his control a balanced force which premised a fair opportunity of success. 5. If personal responsibility for Middle Eastern activities attached to one officer, he would delegate such responsibility from top to bottom of the chain of command. Immediate reaction would be to energize all ranks for in the event of failure all ranks would risk being relieved. FELLERS -4- |