-6- had proved weak tools of the enemies of Germany. They had been unable or unwilling to prevent foreign agents from stirring up agitation and from concocting plots, with the connivance of the Czechoslovak military, against Germany. How could Germany guarantee the frontiers of a nation which was being deliberately turned into a menace to the heart of Germany? That, and that alone, had been the reason for the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, and the support by Germany of the independence of Slovakia, and the consent by Germany for the earlier movements affecting Czechoslovak territory by Poland and Hungary. And then the Minister turned to Poland. The Fuehrer had always maintained that the separation of the German city of Danzig from the Reich, and the complete divorce of East Prussia from Greater Germany were provisions of the Versailles Treaty which could not endure. But at the same time he had been convinced that these questions could be solved satisfactorily by means of a direct understanding between Poland and Germany. In that spirit the non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland had been entered into. Early in the year 1938 negotiations had been commenced between the German Foreign 0ffice and Colonel Beck looking towards the restoration of Danzig to the Reich, and the granting to Germany of an extraterritorial motor road and railroad across the Corridor between Greater Germany and East Prussia. These conversations had prospered. They had reached a complete agreement in principle when Colonel Beck had visited Berlin and Berchtesgaden early in 1939. In a few months, granted there had been no foreign interference, the entire arrangement would have been concluded to the entire satisfaction of Poland, and Germany would have abided permanently by this settlement. |