Kingdom and France could easily undertake the responsi-
 
bility. 
 
     Such an argument'takes little account of Russia
 
or of Italy and Japan, nor does it make allowance for the
 
probable frictions in South Eastern Europe.
 
Russia-The emergence of Russia from an absorption on 
     internal affairs into a markedly imperialistic 
     country may prove to be a factor of the utmost 
     moment. In the event of a German defeat or even 
     of a prolonged military stalemate, there is consider-
     able probability of a rapid spread of bolshevism in 
     Germany. Not only is this the case but countries 
     such as Hungary and Roumania with their numerical 
     predominance of poverty-stricken peasants must be 
     regarded as ripe for communism. After an Allied 
     victory it might easily be the case that the frontiers 
     of bolshevism would be advanced to the Elbe and might 
     also include a great part of South Eastern Europe. If
     this enormous area was under the control of an 
     aggressive Russia, the military responsibilities of
     the Allies would be vast imposing an intolerable 
     burden on their peoples.
 
Italy-    Group A methods of dealing with Italy are not
     known but it is certain that Italy must either be 
     convinced that her interests lie in a co-ooerative
     world (Group B) or, alternatively, her imperial 
     ambitions must be met at someone's expense.
 
Japan- The position of Japan is peculiarly difficult 
     from the Group A standpoint. If Japan obtains a
     hegonomy in the Far East, it can only be at the 
     sacrifice of Allied and American interests, and in
     such circumstances her military would be a permanent 
     menace. The provision of adequate outlets for 
     Japanese enterprise in a peaceful world would re-
     quire radical change in Allied commercial policy, 
     a solution which can be contemplated by Group B 
     but hardly by Group A.
 
Balkans-The restoration of the status euo of say 1951
     (i.e. Europe as it was but with a di'sarmed or perhaps 
     a dismembered Germany) would not solve any of the 
     Balkan problems. It is to be assumed that Group A 
     envisage an Anglo-French military combination strong 
     enough to dictate peaceful settlements of Balkan 
     troubles.
 
               This might be practicable if Russia was in-
     different or quiescent but with an active Russian
     policy the difficulties might be insuperable.
 
Germany-Perhaps the most serious obstacle to the 
     fulfilment of Group A ideas in Germany herself, 
     There have been two periods in the last 150 years 
     when Germany has been prostrate after military defeat. 
     After Jena the repressive actions of the French led 
     to a remarkable movement towards German Unity and the
 
                                                       resurgence