one satisfactory solution, and that was for him as Prime
 
Minister to make a public communication to the President
 
of the United States pledging Great Britain as having no
 
designs upon the safety or welfare of the German people,
 
nor of having any intention of destroying the German
 
Reich. A commitment of this character he said would in-
 
volve no obligations nor responsibilities upon the United
 
States; it would be merely a unilateral declaration of
 
policy by Great Britain. But since it would be made
 
officially by the British Prime Minister to the President
 
of the United States it would unquestionably have so bind-
 
lng an effect upon governments in England which might suc-
 
ceed his, as to make it impossible for them to deviate from
 
the course he so charted. He believed that this public
 
declaration, made by the British Government to the Presi-
 
dent of the United States, could not but be known through-
 
out Germany within a short time, and would be regarded by 
 
the German people as a guarantee which would have a binding 
 
character. He asked me what my own opinion might be.
 
        I replied that I would immediately upon my return to 
 
Washington communicate his suggestion to the President for 
 
his decision, and that I assumed the latter would wish to
 
see the text of any suggested declaration before reaching 
 
any final opinion.
 
     Mr. Chamberlain then said that he had thought a great
 
deal, and had spoken with a few of his colleagues, since
 
our last conversation. He did not believe that a miracle 
 
would occur, and that Germany would enter into any ar-
 
rangement which would offer, any real guarantee of security 
 
to the Allies, so long as Hitler or his group remained in 
 
control of Germany. However, if such a miracle did occur,
 
                                                            and