He hoped that no public suggestion of any peace steps
 
would be made until thase difficulties had been fully
 
threshed out. I said that I f elt warranted in saying that
 
no steps would be taken by my Government in any form unless
 
the President believed that a oracticable basis for a real
 
and lasting peace had been found. It did not seem to me
 
possible that it could be thought that such a basis existed,
 
unless the Governments most directly concerned agreed that
 
such a basis existed.
 
       Mr. Chamberlain then spoke of the Finnish situation and 
 
of his inability to find any way to persuade Sweden to permit 
 
the passes of British and French troops or supplies through
 
Sweden. He feared Finland was doomed to at least a part of
 
the fate suffered by Czechoslovkia.
 
     He spoke with appreciation of the efforts of Mussolini
 
to bring about a reasonable understanding at Munich, and with
 
equal appreciation of the attempt of both Mussolini and Ciano
 
to prevent Hitler from invading Poland last August. He was
 
detemined to do everything possible to prevent friction and 
 
misunderstanding between Italy and Great Britain, and it was 
 
for that reason that he had orevented a crisis from arising
 
a few days before with regard to the stoppage by the British 
 
Blockade authorities of Italian colliers laden with coal from 
 
Germany destined for Italian consumption. He believed that
 
England could arrange to let Italy have 4,000,000 tons of 
 
British coal yearly which Italy could arrange to pay for.
 
     At this point the conference ended since it was half 
 
past seven and Mr. Chamberlain had invited me to dine with 
 
him at 8:30.