Paris, March 14, 1940.
 
     M. Paul Reynaud, the French Secretary of the Treasury,
 
came to see me at my hotel, and spent an hour with me
 
prior to my taking my train to Rome.
 
     The Minister had come from the Senate, where the
 
debate was in progress upon the failure of the French Gov-
 
eminent to render effective military aid to Finland. He
 
said that he feared the French Parliament would not regard
 
the Government's case as very strong. He said, however, 
 
that he and M. Daladler were working closely together.
 
       He asked me what my impressions of the attitude of 
 
the British Government might be with regard to a peace 
 
possibility. I replied that I had found the British Gov-
 
eminent as moderate and as constructive in its point of 
 
view as I had found him in our talk five days before. It 
 
seemed clearer than ever to me, I added, that the great 
 
key problem today was security and disarmament.
 
     If, I said, any Government now engaged in war refused
 
to negotiate on that basis, there seemed to me to be no 
 
hope of there being any possibility of the establishment 
 
of any lasting peace.
 
     The Minister said that he had thought much of this
 
question since we had last spoken. Winston Churchill
 
had paid him a midnight visit mwo nights before. Mr.
 
Churchill's point of view was utterly intransigent.
 
M. Renaud felt that while Mr. Churchill was a briIliant
 
and most entertaining man, with great capacity for organi-
 
zation, his mind had lost its elasticity. He felt that 
 
Mr. Churchill could conceive of no possibility other than
 
war to the finish--whether that resulted in utter chaos
 
 
                                         and