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together in declaring war upon the aggressor. He said that he
felt that upon this foundation an effective disarmament scheme
could be worked out, which would result in the abolition of offensive
types of airplanes and of other armaments, and in an international
control (which might later be enlarged to include the smaller
European states) to undertake the abolition of offensive
types of armaments including the factories where they were
manufactured.
Count Ciano expressed complete pessimism as to the results
of the interview to be held at the Brenner Pass. He said
that since Ribbentrop would be present at the interview with
Hitler, Mussolini would not be afforded the opportunity of per-
suading Hitler to follow a more reasonable course. He himself,
he said, had time and again had interviews with Hitler, had seen
Hitler reach the point of reasonable understanding, only to have
Ribbentrop interject and change Hitler's point of view. He said
that he believed that an offensive was imminent, and that Germany
would pursue exactly the same policy which she had pursued in
Poland, namely the unrestricted bombardment of cities including
the bombarment of London and Paris, and the creation of the same
kind of a reign of terror which had lasted during the eighteen
days of the Polish War. He said that he believed,
however, that the Allies would win out. He said that the only way,
in his own judgment, in which Germany could win would be by breaking
through into France, whereas if the Allies successfully remained
defensive they themselves would ultimately achieve victory.
He told me, particularly confidentially, that the reason
why he believed the German offensive was imminent was because
when Hitler had requested the interview with Mussolini, Mussolini
had suggested March 19th as t.he date for the meeting, and Hitler
had replied that ho could not wait beyond March 18th. Hitler
had also stated that he could not give more than an hour's time
to the interview since he would have to be back in Germany
urgently