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additional concessions he desires from Great Britain,
 
namely: the demilitarization of Gibraltar and Malta,
 
the neutralization of the Mediterranean, and (as a
 
minimum) British Somaliland. He desires to retain his
 
strong nuisance value until he can get at the same time
 
what he wants from both Allies.
 
     A highly Intelligent Italian high up in the Gov-
 
ernment said to me "It was a great tragedy for Italy
 
when Mussolini visited Berlin two years ago." What he
 
means was that Mussolini was there enormously impressed 
 
with German military strength, and with the ruthless 
 
efficiency of German organization. He came back
 
believing, and I think believes today, that Germany
 
power cannot be defeated. It is highly probable that
 
he fears for his own new northern frontiers, as the new
 
Italian fortifications along the Austrian boundry show,
 
but I cannot help but feel that his haftred for Great
 
Britain and France is so powerful, and his faith in
 
German military supremacy so strong, that he will not
 
modify his axis policy until and unless an Allied victory
 
is indisputably evident.
 
     If, on the other hand, Germany obtains some rapid
 
 
apparent victories, such as the occupation of Holland
 
and Belgium, I fear very much that Mussolini would then
 
force Italy in on the German side--and I use the word
 
"force" advisedly.
 
     No one in the Italian Government wants Italy to get
 
into the war. Count Ciano is violently against it, and
 
no one else in the Government at this moment is more
 
than a figurehead. The General Staff is strongly against 
 
                                        it,