MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Employment of negro man power in war.

I am enclosing a study on the Employment of Negro Man Power in War, made by a committee of The Army War College composed of Colonel Bishop, Major Drain and Major Somervell. It is based on research by previous classes, by the Faculty, as well as on War Department experiences during the World War. It is believed to be of such value in lieu of further study by the General Staff, as to furnish a basis for the employment of the negro in the next war. I recommend, unless and until a more complete study be made on the subject by the General Staff, that it be accepted as the War Department policy in handling this problem.

While the basic communication is not marked "Secret", it has been so regarded at the War College.

H. E. Ely,
Major General U. S. A.
Commandant.

2 incls.
(in dup)
Notes on proposed plan for use of negro manpower.  
(Not a part of the plan)

1. The fundamental conception upon which this plan is based is that the military manpower of the United States, white or black, should be assigned to duties in the Army for which it is qualified. Military considerations alone should govern in war.

2. The negro does not perform his share of civil duties in time of peace in proportion to his population. He has no leaders in industrial or commercial life. He takes no part in government. Compared to the white man he is admittedly of inferior mentality. He is inherently weak in character.

3. The negro issue should be met squarely. The War Department had no pre-determined and sound plan for the use of negro troops at the beginning of the World War. It had no adequate defense against political and racial pressure and was forced to organize negro combat divisions and commission unqualified negro officers. The results are well known.

4. The War Department when occasion demands should be able to present this matter frankly to those who make demands or should know the facts.

   The negro, particularly the officer, failed in the World War. The door will not be closed against him on this account. He will be given an opportunity to take part in war in accordance with his qualifications in exactly the same field of activity as are allotted the white man.

   He will be accepted for service by the identical standards applied to the white man.

   While in the service he will be measured by the standards applied to the white man. This includes, reclassification, elimination, and rewards of promotion and decoration.

   He will be given a sound plan of organization, training and leadership.

   He will be given tasks he may reasonably be expected to perform. If he makes good he will have the opportunity eventually to fight in the war with all-negro organizations.

   If he fails to qualify to fight as a race he will be limited to such tasks as he can perform under white leadership.

   What he accomplishes in war will depend upon the negro.

5. There should be no sentiment about the use of negro troops in war.

   It is not sound to contend that he should bear losses in war in proportion to his population relative to white population. The basis of his employment in war should be that applied to white soldiers, viz., qualifications and capabilities for military service.

   In the American Expeditionary Forces in France the negro's total share of losses was 1-1/2%.
6. If the negro should be called into service on a plan based on the numerical strength of his population his share of man power for the Mobilization Plan would be almost twice the quota, which under the standards developed in the World War, he can furnish.

7. The Mobilization Plan provides for approximately 140,000 negroes for non-combatant duty. This would leave approximately 30,000 for the experiment of combat duty.

8. The majority of negroes left at home will be in the southern states where they will be needed for labor and where they can best be handled by competent whites.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: The use of negro man power in war.

I. Papers accompanying.
   Reference "A". Analysis of the physical, mental, moral and psychological qualities and characteristics of the negro as a sub-species of the human family.
   Reference "B" Performance of the negro in past wars
   Reference "C" The negro officer.
   Reference "D" Negro political activity in the World War.
   Reference "E" Plan for the organization and employment in war of the negro man power drafted and found physically and mentally qualified for military service.

II. The problem presented
   Under the Constitution the negro has the rights of citizenship. He forms a considerable part of the population of the United States. It is evident that he must bear his share of the burden of war.
   To what extent shall negro man power be used in a military effort contemplated by the War Department General Mobilization Plan?
   How shall it be organized?
   How shall it be officered?
   How shall it be trained and employed in the Theatres of Operations and the Zone of the Interior?
   What standards should be used in the appointment and promotion of negro officers?

III. Facts bearing upon the problem.
   I. The Negro is physically qualified for combat duty.
      He is by nature subservient and believes himself to be inferior to the white man.
      He is most susceptible to the influence of crowd psychology.
      He cannot control himself in the fear of danger to the extent the white man can.
      He has not the initiative and resourcefulness of the white men.
      He is mentally inferior to the white man.
      Reference "A".
2. In past wars the negro has made a fair laborer. As a technician and a fighter he has been inferior to the white men.

Reference "B"

3. In the World War the negro officer was a failure in combat.

Reference "C"

4. In the World War political pressure forced the formation of two negro combat divisions and the commissioning of about 600 negro officers.

Reference "D"

5. There are 11,000,000 negroes in the United States. The total number which according to the standards developed in the World War are qualified to be soldiers is 352,922. Applying the same standards to the white men we find that the negro can furnish 6.18 of the total man power in the United States qualified for military service. On this basis his contribution of man power to the total required by the War Department General Mobilization Plan is 209,679.

Reference "E"

IV. Opinion of the War College

1. In the process of evolution the American negro has not progressed as far as the other sub-species of the human family. As a race he has not developed leadership qualities. His mental inferiority and the inherent weaknesses of his character are factors that must be considered with great care in the preparation of any plan for his employment in war.

2. The life of the nation is at stake in war. Neither the white man nor the negro should be given tasks they are not qualified to perform. However, the plan for the use of the man power of the United States in war should be fair to both races.

3. In the past wars the negro has made a fair laborer, but an inferior technician. As a fighter he has been inferior to the white man even when led by white officers.

4. The negro officer was a failure as a combat officer in the World War.

5. The door should not be closed against the negro because of his failure in the World War. He should be given a fair opportunity to perform the tasks in war for which he is qualified or may qualify himself under a sound plan of organization, training and leadership. He should be measured by the same standards applied to the white men.
6. In making effective the War Department General Mobilization Plan the total number of negroes to be taken into the military service should be 209,679.

7. The largest negro unit that should be organized on mobilization is the battalion. These battalions should be assigned to divisions of the Regular Army and the National Guard in the proportion of one battalion to a division for combat training. If and when these battalions demonstrate satisfactory combat efficiency they should be grouped progressively into larger units with the division as the ultimate aim.

8. Negro soldiers as individuals should not be assigned to white units.

9. The total number of negro combat units to be organized or mobilized should be sufficient to form one complete Infantry division less headquarters of larger units. This number should be organized into battalions, trains, etc., and distributed by services and branches in the proportions indicated by tables of organization for the Infantry divisions. The remainder of the negro quota, after deducting the number necessary for training and replacement purposes and frontier and other duty in the Zone of the Interior, should be assigned to the Engineers, Quartermaster Corps, Air Service, Cavalry, Coast Artillery, and Medical Department in accordance with the occupational qualifications of the men and the needs of these services.

10. At the beginning of the war the negro combat units should be officered entirely by white officers except in the grade of lieutenant. Only negro officers who hereafter graduate from training camps where they have qualified for appointment as combat officers in accordance with standards applied to white candidates should be assigned to these units. The white officers assigned to negro combat units should be carefully selected.

11. White and negro lieutenants should be assigned to negro combat units in numbers to insure that at all times the companies will have double the number of lieutenants in corresponding white organizations. During the period of combat training the number of negro lieutenants in negro combat units should not exceed the number of white lieutenants.

12. Initially negro officers above the grade of lieutenant, and all other negro officers not included in Par. 10 above, should be assigned in general to non-combatant units of negro troops. They should be observed, tested, reclassified, eliminated or advanced eventually to combat assignments in accordance with the standards applied to white officers.

13. Negro officers should not be placed over white officers, noncommissioned officers or soldiers.

14. Negro officer candidates should attend training camps with white candidates. They should have the same instructors, take the same tests and meet the same requirements for appointment as officers as the white candidates. They should be sheltered, messed and instructed separately from white candidates.
15. Citations, decorations, and promotion for demonstrated efficiency should be given the negro in accordance with the standards applied to the white man.

16. This plan provides for the initial assignment of negro manpower at the outbreak of war. It will be seen that the eventual use of the negro will be determined by his performance in combat training and service. If and when the battalions assigned to white divisions qualify for combat service, they will be assigned to this duty. If the negro makes good the way is left open for him to go into combat eventually with all-negro units. If the negro officer fails to demonstrate his ability to lead his own troops they will be led by white officers. The formation of all-negro units should be made gradually, starting with the company. They should be led by negro officers who have demonstrated their ability to lead. When they have qualified for combat duty they should be given an opportunity to demonstrate in combat whether or not they should progress to larger units.

17. The guiding principle in this plan is military efficiency. The plan is believed to be eminently fair to both the negro and the white man. Political or racial pressure should not be allowed to alter it.

V. Action recommended.

It is recommended that this study be taken as the basis of the policy of the War Department for the use of negro manpower and that the plan proposed herein be used as a guide in the revision of the War Department General Mobilization Plan.

VI. Concurrences.

The policies and plan for the use of negro manpower proposed in this study are the culmination of several years study by the faculty and student body of the Army War College.

H.E. Ely,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commandant.
1. Physical.

During the World War statistics indicate that rejections of Class I registrants for white and negro races were respectively, 30.29% and 25.4%. Without investigation this might seem to indicate that the negro is physically inferior to the white. It appears, however, that the standards prescribed for the whites were not maintained for the negro. Rates of non-effectives in negro units were so high as to cause a protest from General Pershing. He wired, "Colored Stevedore troops arriving with tuberculosis, old fractures, extreme flat feet, hernia, venereal diseases all existing prior to enlistment, not able to stand hardship of climate and travel, larger proportion of sick than among white troops. Recommend elimination of unfit by rigid physical examination before embarking."

Based upon his observation of the poor physical condition of colored stevedore troops, orders were issued to eliminate the physical unfit negroes before their departure from a port of embarkation. After the issue of such orders, 4% of 3,602 colored drafted men sent from Camp Pike to Newport News were found unfit for overseas service on medical examination at the port of embarkation. Authority had, however, been given in this case to send on from Camp Pike men suffering from venereal disease but not receiving daily treatment.

"The physical condition of a large part of the colored draft is very poor. Many must be entirely eliminated and a large portion of those left are not fit for combat duty." - Lytle Brown, A. C. of S., W. P. D., to Chief of Staff.

"A further examination into this case shows that the Commanding General, Camp Pike was not trying to unload undesirables on the Port of Embarkation. He realized they were for overseas service and he sent the pick of what he had but that is the class of men the colored drafted men were. Other examples could be given but it would be cumulative testimony along the same lines." - Col. E. D. Anderson, G. S., Chairman, Operations Branch.

Taking this case, which is stated to be more or less typical, the Surgeon at Camp Pike said: "From a conservative estimate I will state that fully 90% of all negroes received at the Depot Brigade, now have or have had venereal diseases in some form."

The situation with reference to the physical condition of negroes during the war is shown in the following quotation from a report from Col. Anderson to the Chief of Staff: "The present policy is to accept men with certain ailments along this line and to send them to the camps to receive the necessary treatment before starting them on their training. The large percentage of colored men temporarily unfit reduces the effective strength while the space they occupy might well be used by able-bodied men." This difference between whites and negroes is also apparent in the disability discharge rate which was, respectively 42 and 80 per thousand.

From this it is clear that the number of physical defectives among the negroes was much higher than among the whites and that full weight can not be given to the figures of the Provost Marshal General, as different standards were used in the physical examination of white and negro draftees. It can be further deduced from this that the negro is physically inferior to the white men and that more rigid examinations must be conducted in the
next war. The Southern negroes, who form the bulk of the race endurance and stamina in cold rigorous climates is low. His normal physical activity is generally small, due to his laziness.

2. Mental.

It is generally recognized that the pure blood American negro is inferior to our white population in mental capacity. Such negroes as have shown marked mental attainments also show a heavy strain of white blood.

"The negroes are descended from slave imported from West Africa. Their characteristics, physically, were formerly quite uniform and show them to be very low in the scale of human evolution." The cranial cavity of the negro is smaller than the white; his brain weighing 35 ounces contrasted with 45 for the white.

The intelligence of the negro is shown in his ability to compete with the white in professions and other activities in peace time when mental equipment is an essential for success.

To turn to a statistical proof of this mental inferiority we have only to consider the intelligence tests conducted during the war. In the table following, taken from page 707 of the Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, "Group IV is approximately a pro-rata selection by States so that the entire group is geographically representative of the country at large." The table shows "at once the striking inferiority of the colored recruits." The comparison is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RACE</th>
<th>NO. OF CASES</th>
<th>D-</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>C-</th>
<th>C+</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites, Group I, II, IV</td>
<td>93,973</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroes, Group IV</td>
<td>18,891</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The striking thing about this table is that only 0.1% were rated as superior or 1/41st of the whites so rated and that practically one-half (49%) were rated as d-, a grade considered "too poor to make a satisfactory soldier." The loss expected in the whites in this respect is only 7%. These memoirs give several other comparisons which present cumulative testimony along this line.

The distribution of these men is not all uniform, however, as is shown in the following graph:
From this we can expect to find the fewest number of mentally crippled Negroes in the Northern States.

The A and B grades officer material, in so far as mental equipment is concerned, are likewise quite apparent from the table and graph. Written comment was invited from the officers who made the rating and their responses are summarized as follows:

(a) All officers, without exception, agree that the Negro lacks initiative, displays little or no leadership, and cannot accept responsibility. Some point out that these defects are greater in the Southern Negro.

The actual mental test on Negro officers and officer candidates at Camp Dodge was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer Group</th>
<th>No. of Cases</th>
<th>D-</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>C-</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>C-</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White officers</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro officers</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro officers' training</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the unfavorable showing of these few Negroes, it will be noted that the percentages of white in this table are below the general average of whites at that camp and that Camp Dodge was only about average among the whole number of camps.

**Rank of camps by intelligence ratings of Officers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent A Grade</th>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Per cent A and B Grades</th>
<th>Previous figures per cent A and B Grades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>Humphreys</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>Taylor</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>Travis</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>Meade</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>Sherman</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>Dodge</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>Devens</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>Upton</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>Pike</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>Sheridan</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>Wadsworth</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>Cody</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>Wheeler</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>Greenleaf</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. On account of the ever present danger of "rape cases" and the conflict between the economic side of the question and racial feeling, the negro, generally speaking, should be trained in the locality from which drafted, and there should never be a time when the negro organizations are not very much in the minority in any camp (general opinion is that they should never exceed 1/3 the strength of any camp).

VII. Size of Negro Combat Units.

1. Due to his susceptibility to "Crowd Psychology" a large mass of negroes, e.g., a division, is very subject to panic. Experience had indicated that the negroes produce better results by segregation and cause less trouble. Grouping of negroes generally in the past has produced demands for equality, both during war and after demobilization. The 92d Division was a failure, admitted by all competent officers in the division and by other trained observers and leaders.

Many of our Organized Reserve Divisions are approaching completion as to units. Their organization is voluntary - to force a negro unit upon them would mean their disintegration as soon as the present obligation of the officers expired.

2. General Pershing stated that he wanted organizations no larger than a regiment to be used as were the regiments of the 92d Division. The defeat of a regiment would stop the action of a division and possibly that of a corps, it can hardly cause disaster to an army, nor, if reserves are available, to a corps or division. A regiment in defense generally has 2 battalions on the lien - the negro is weak on defense and especially liable to losses in raids. The best opinion on the subject is a compromise between safety and morale in choosing between a regiment and a battalion would favor the selection of the battalion as the largest negro unit initially.

3. There is no apparent reason why one arm of the service should use negro troops and another should not. One arm may require more educated men and specialists than another, but so long as men of suitable qualifications can be found, there is no reason to exempt the arm. On the other hand it would be foolish to make up any arm of men lacking the necessary qualifications.

VIII. Detailed Extracts from various sources relative to the performance of Negro in Past Wars.

1. All of the foregoing data is a general statement arranged in narrative form but extracts from signed, official statements of competent military officers who had the interests of the negro at heart, but not to the exclusion of making any lowering of the required standards for military efficiency in battle. The general trend of those comments may be summed up as follows:

The services of the negro in past wars has been most satisfactory in the capacity of labor troops and while not entirely satisfactory in combat, he should be given an opportunity to prove his worth under trained leaders, preferably white."

2. The following extracts are given in complete detail:
(a) Extract from Supplement No. 1 to Report of Committee No. 7 entitled "Historical Study of the Employment of Negro Manpower in War."
2. An opinion expressed by many experienced officers who have had long
service with negro troops is as follows:

"The negro does not desire combat duty under conditions of present
day warfare. That if when drafted into service he was given a choice
of assignment to a combat organization or to a "Labor Battalion" (a
more attractive title would be better for this class of duty, e.g., 'Service
of Conservation and Repair') the majority would choose the less dangerous
service."

V. Combat Characteristics of the Negro.
1. Generally speaking, taking the average of the Draft, only about six
percent - less than eight per cent - have the characteristics to be combat
soldiers - from the mental standpoint alone, hence the difficulty of finding
suitable noncommissioned officers, for they must not only be mentally fit,
but likewise possess initiative and courage.

2. An opinion held in common by practically all officers is that the
negro is a rank coward in the dark. His fear of the unknown and unseen will
prevent him from ever operating as an individual scout with success. His lack
of versatility causes unsatisfactory reports to be rendered, particularly on
patrol duty.

3. World War experience implies that the negro may not stand grilling
combat with heavy losses. In general the negro has confidence in white lead-
ers and granted proper initial training before going into battle, he will
follow the white leader with the utmost bravery. One of the peculiarities
of the negro as a soldier is that he has no confidence in his negro leaders,
nor will he follow a negro officer into battle, no matter how good the officer
may be, with the same confidence and lack of fear that he will follow a white
man. This last trait has been so universally reported by all commanders that
it can not be considered as a theory - the negroes themselves recognize it as
a fact.

VI. Combat training for the Negro.
1. The negro needs trained leadership far more than the white man needs
it, and above all they need leaders in whom they have confidence, and whose
presence they can feel and see at all times.

2. On account of the inherent weaknesses in negro character, especially
general lack of intelligence and initiative, it requires much longer time of
preliminary training to bring a negro organization up to the point of training
where it is fit for combat, than it does in the case of white men. All
theoretical instruction is beyond the mental grasp of the negro - it must be
intensely practical, supplemented by plain talks explaining the reasons for
things in simple terms. It is necessary to distinguish the negroes' ability
to memorize a subject from a true understanding of this subject. Since a
large amount of individual instruction will be found necessary in a negro
organization, it is desirable to have about double the number of instructors
with them as with a white organization. Due to the special necessity of close
observation in the lower units of negro organizations - Platoons - the same
need of a double complement of lieutenants in combat is apparent.
I. Introduction.

The performance of the negro in past wars deals solely with the American negro. It must be remembered that French colored troops are exclusively recruited from among the most mentally primitive populations and it would be impossible to compare them to the colored population of the United States. Even the French dark skinned Colonial levies in the World War have been found available as combat troops only in very limited numbers and under special conditions and long and slow training by competent officers.

II. Period prior to the World War.

1. During the Revolutionary War few negroes were used, but no unit composed entirely of negroes was ever raised. The so called "Rhode Island Black Regiment" was a battalion of four companies organized in 1778; less than half were negroes and their service was apparently satisfactory.

2. Two battalions of negroes participated in the Battle of New Orleans (War of 1812), where they fought behind entrenchments with white troops, closely supported by artillery. All the officers were white and their service was apparently satisfactory.

3. In the Civil War after the Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863) some 178,000 negroes were mustered into the service, as infantry, cavalry and artillery. With but few exceptions their officers were white. Their service met with many commendatory orders, but instances arose where units were reported incompetent, and cases of mutinies and misbehavior also occurred when leadership was not efficient.

4. During the Indian Campaigns, Spanish War and Philippine Insurrection the regular negro regiments participated in a number of engagements. Their officers were almost without exception white and the noncommissioned officers and many men had long service, and were well disciplined. Their service was satisfactory.

5. Prior to the World War several instances have occurred of note between negro soldiers and white civilians, such as the Houston and Brownsville affairs.

III. World War Record of the Negro

1. During the World War great numbers of labor and service battalions were raised from the negroes. A complete combat division, the 92nd, was organized in which the company officers of infantry and machine gun units were negroes. This division had service on the quiet fronts and in reserve in the Argonne, one regiment of which was in the front line. Its conduct was so bad that it was removed in a few days, the regimental commander asking for the removal of 35 negro officers for inefficiency and cowardice. The organizations that had white officers were markedly superior in this division to those that had colored. The trains and special services were reasonably efficient. The heavy artillery regiment with all white officers was the best negro unit.
African ancestors, cultivated by several generations of slavery, followed by about three generations of evolution from slavery in the anomalous state of legal without actual equality with the white, is one from which we cannot expect to draw leadership material.

Summarizing these characteristics, it appears that:

- The negro is profoundly superstitious.
- He is by nature sub-servient and naturally believes himself inferior to the white.
- He is jolly, tractable, lively and docile by nature, but through real or supposed harsh or unjust treatment may become sullen and stubborn.
- He is very susceptible to the influence of crowd psychology. In consequence of this a panic among negro troops is much more serious and harder to control than one among whites.

The psychology of the negro is such that we may not expect to draw leadership material from his race. The negro has not a great deal of confidence in leaders of his own race and it would be an impossibility to place leaders of his race over whites.

The psychology of the negro is such that whites as leaders he can serve in combat troops. He has confidence in the superiority of the white and the fact that whites are with him in time of danger puts off the time when his courage gives out.

He has not the physical courage of the white. He simply cannot control himself in fear of some danger in the degree that the white man can.

His psychology is such that he willingly accepts hard labor and for this reason can well be employed in labor troops or other non-combatant branches.

The negro is immoral. He simply does not see that certain things are wrong.

The negro is one of the most secretive in the world.

While the negro undoubtedly has a state of mind bordering on resentment directed against the white, this feeling is numbed by his easy-going nature.

The negro's growing sense of importance will make them more and more of a problem, and racial troubles may be expected to increase.

5. Social.

The negro's physical, mental, moral, and other psychological characteristics have made it impossible for him to associate socially with any except the lowest class of whites. The only exceptions to this are the negro concubines who have sometimes attracted men who, except for this association, were considered high class.

The social inequality makes the close association of whites and blacks in military organization inimicable to harmony and efficiency.
defense, as a race, against the whites.

A curious feature of the negro's psychology is his susceptibility to the influence of crowd psychology. We have had some painful experiences along this line in the army, notably the Brownsville riot. Other cases have occurred entirely without the military establishment wherein crowd psychology has seized upon a mass or group of negroes and precipitated a race war. It is useless to examine the causes of these for the plain facts are that regardless of causes individual negroes of the crowd would never have behaved as they have done were it not for the influence of the crowd. There is no race that is not susceptible to crowd psychology but the negro is easier swayed by it and harder to control when under its influence than others.

Closely allied to crowd psychology is the question of physical courage. In physical courage it must be admitted that the American negro falls well back of the white man and possibly behind all other races. All men, if not actually afraid of death are anxious in varying measures to avoid it. Self-preservation is said to be the first law of nature and self-preservation is but the natural avoidance of an early extinction. All members of the human family in common with all animals possess the instinct for self-preservation and the negro probably possesses it in no greater measure than the rest of mankind. The white, in general, is able to control his fear in the presence of danger and keep about the occupation in which he is engaged with at least a semblance of coolness. The negro, on the other hand, is not so capable in controlling the instinct of self-preservation. His psychological makeup is such that he is unable to control his emotions beyond a certain point. When this point is reached the "cave in" occurs and then all his efforts are bent on self-preservation. Duty, propriety, discretion and obligation are all thrown to the winds. This cannot, however, be held against him. No reasoning being can expect more of a certain nature than exists in that nature. The reason that the negro gives way under fear of some danger is exactly the same reason as that which causes the white to do the same, only the negro is likely to do so under less pressure than the white and consequently his breaking point will come more quickly. It may be likened to putting a continually increasing strain on a rope. It finally breaks because the material of which it is made is not strong enough to stand the added pull. There is this to be said however: As the negro recognizes the white as his superior he will under white control, and in the presence of whites, stand much greater pressure from impending danger than he will in a group of negroes alone.

Another feature that affects the psychology of the negro is his close association with the white race during the past two centuries. This has had an effect in two ways. Within limits the negro has acquired a veneer of the white man's culture. The negro has taken up the white man's religion and while with some the matter of religious conviction is deep-seated and real in general, it is believed to be superficial; and, were contact with the whites removed, would soon degenerate into superstitious forms or be effaced entirely. No race could have stood the amount of oppression in the form of slavery, openly expressed contempt, injustice, enforced segregation, etc., that the negro has from the white without evolving a form of psychology against the white. It would be futile for us to try to believe that the negro has no peculiar state of mind against us. He undoubtedly has. While the negro must feel some tinge of resentment against the race that has enslaved him in the past and now holds him as a thing apart, it must be agreed that this state of mind is to a great extent allayed by the innate easy-going nature of the negro.

The psychology of the negro, based on heredity derived from mediocre
3. **Morals.**

As judged by white standards, the negro is immoral. His ideas with relation to honor and sex relations are not on the same plane as those of our white population. Petty thieving, lying, and promiscuity are much more common among negroes than among whites. Atrocities connected with white women have been the cause of considerable trouble among negroes. Experience before and in the World War showed that the negro will protect his color in cases of emergency without regard to truth. The same lack of honesty was evident with reference to reports, the lack of information being supplied from an active imagination.

"The negro officer has in my opinion been a failure. He has not the fine points of honor which should characterize the American Army officer." C. O. of Regt. of 92nd Div.

I do not remember of a single patrol report coming from an officer that ever gave sufficient information x x x practically every report had to be checked by some white officer. The check nearly always showed total ignorance on the part of the negro leader and usually a disregard of truth. Also, it is another fact which we found that colored officers cliqued together and sought at all times to protect the members of their own race, no matter whether they were right or wrong." C. of S., 92nd Division.

"The conclusion forced by the observation of a large number of cases was that the colored officer was of almost no value in the conduct of night patrols. He would perhaps go out a short distance, kill a lot of time, and return with a report of conditions as could just as readily have been written if he had not gone out at all. Or, by some flight of the imagination, he would concoct a fanciful story of places and events entirely non-existent, but difficult to disprove at the time." C.G., 92nd Division.

If this was the state of affairs among their more intelligent picked men, i.e., their officers, the situation with regard to the rank and file can be well imagined.

4. **Psychological.**

One is inclined to believe that a member of one race is not fitted to write authoritatively on the psychology of another. The white mind and the negro mind are very different. Some people claim to understand the negroes while others whose opinions are of just as much weight say that this is impossible. There are, however, certain factors that influence the psychology of the American negro and to a certain extent we may go.

All American negroes are descendants of some tribe or tribes of Africa. From these antecedents the negro inherits a profoundly superstitious nature. The belief in fetiches exists to this day and the negro will still take great stock in signs and omens. These are very real to the negro and overpower and at times supplant the veneer of religious culture he has acquired from the whites.

The negro's racial experience as a slave has bred in him a peculiar form of mind. He has become by nature sub-servient. He instinctively regards the white man as his superior. He is willing to give way to the white man as a general rule and he does this unthinkingly. His period of service as a slave and his mental caliber cause him to accept unhappily as proper and natural, work that would disgust the white.

In general the negro is jolly, docile and tractable, and lively but with harsh or unkind treatment can become stubborn, sullen and unruly. Innate self-will is a part of his nature. This may be a result of his period of existence as a slave. It was then his one sure weapon of
UNITED STATES

Introductory

So far as the United States is concerned we may consider the negro to be descended from the slaves who were imported principally during the 18th and early part of the 19th Century from the West Coast of Africa. They belonged to the true negro stock, which shows great similarity of physical characteristics, qualities which have been greatly altered due to continued crossing with whites since arrival in this country.

The West Coast negro, according to the best authorities, is very low in the scale of human elevation; his brain capacity averages about 35 ounces as contrasted with the white man's 45 ounces. He did not belong to the warrior tribes, such as are found in South Africa, but on the contrary was peaceable, indolent and backward.

After being brought to this country his status as a slave gave him almost no legal rights, did little to raise his moral standards, and instead of producing the qualities so necessary in a soldier of individual courage, initiative and pride of nationality or race, acted in quite the contrary manner. These facts are necessary to consider in studying the history of the American negro in the various wars in which he has participated.

The study herewith is merely an outline with such conclusions as seemed pertinent.

Revolutionary War.

The question of employing negroes as soldiers was considered very early in the Revolution. In 1775 Washington prohibited in orders the enlistment of any negro. Notwithstanding this fact, it seems evident that a few free negroes had been in the army since the beginning of the war. Later the re-enlistment of such of these as had been discharged was authorized.

A number of efforts were made during the course of the war by various individuals to get the States to enlist slaves, the reward being freedom. Most of these plans were not favorably received. However, there is no doubt that during the entire war, negro slaves and freedom were in the ranks and continued to be enlisted in most of the states, especially when the pressure for recruits increased toward the latter years of the struggle. A return of August, 1778, showed 755 in Washington's Army two months after the Battle of Monmouth.

An attempt to raise a negro organization was made in one instance only; this was the so-called "Rhode Island Black Regiment," authorized by the legislature of that State in 1778. It really was a battalion of four companies, and participated creditably in a number of actions from 1778 until the end of the war. The greatest number of negroes in the organization was in 1780, at which time 150 of its enlisted personnel were negroes, all of the officers being white. Many references are made of this being a negro organization, which is contrary to the facts shown above, for at no time was half of its strength colored.
Conclusions.

Apparently the principal reason for the enlistment of negroes was the difficulty of obtaining other recruits. No unit composed entirely of negroes was raised, and only in the Rhode Island Black Regiment was there an appreciable number. Here they were combat soldiers; elsewhere no reference has been found of the character of their employment. In this mixed organization they apparently performed satisfactory service.

The War of 1812.

During the earlier part of the war no colored troops were used, but as the struggle continued recruits became scarce as during the Revolution and again some steps were taken to enlist negroes. In October 1814, the Legislature of New York authorized the raising of two colored regiments, but no records have been found that indicates they were actually mustered into the service. However, some individuals were enlisted.

In September 1814, Andrew Johnson authorized the formation of two battalions of negro freemen which were commanded by Colonel Lacoste and Major D'Aquin. Both of these units had white officers and were on the line at the Battle of New Orleans. No specific record of their performances is given by Lossing other than the fact that the points where they were located which were in the vicinity of the American batteries, were not penetrated by the British attack, and apparently they performed their duty without criticism.

Conclusions.

Behind entrenchments, under white officers and with white troops on both sides and on the defensive, the negro troops behaved properly and gave satisfactory service.

The Mexican War.

No record has been found of the use of any negro troops during this period, and it is most probable that no separate colored units were formed.

The Civil War.

(a) The Union Army.

Prior to 1863 no use was made of negro troops by the Northern States; a number of plans had been discussed, but no action taken until President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was issued on January 1st, 1863, which among other provisions, declared that negroes would be admitted into the armed forces. The policy was to have white officers, although a few negroes were commissioned. During the war some 175,000 colored troops were enlisted which were organized into: five regiments of engineers, later turned into infantry; thirteen regiments of heavy artillery, one regiment and one battery of light artillery; one hundred and thirty-eight regiments and three companies of infantry. In several instances these regiments were grouped into and operated as divisions.

It is exceedingly difficult to get accurate information as to the negro troops in this war. To pull out the facts from the records of the Rebellion would be a task entirely out of the question in the time we are allotted.
for this study, and most writers on the subject have been either negroes or persons who approached the subject from a sentimental standpoint, both having as motives the glorification of the negro.

Negro troops actually took part in many of the battles of the latter part of the war among them Fort Hudson, Fort Wagner, Fort Pillow, Petersburg, Nashville and Fort Fisher. Their conduct as a whole was good. However, there were instances of incompetence and even of mutiny as at Port Hudson where an entire regiment participated in a riot, attempting to shoot one of the officers. A number of the ringleaders were sentenced to be shot for this affair.

(b) The Confederate Army.

From the earliest days of the war negroes had been used by the Confederacy for work on fortifications and as teamsters and cooks. However, no steps were taken to regularly organize them as soldiers until late in the fall of 1864, when the Confederate Congress passed a law authorizing their use, but by not giving freedom to the slaves enlisted practically nullified the effect of the legislation. While a few negro companies were raised they did not participate in active service.

Conclusions.

Scarcity of volunteers and the great number of negro slaves who had attached themselves to the Union Army, coupled with the fact that as freemen there was a demand both sentimental and practical that they should participate in the burdens of war, caused the raising of negro troops. It was a natural sequence to the Emancipation Proclamation.

Such evidence as was examined showed that when well led by white officers their service was very creditable. Where they failed poor leadership was almost certainly to be found.

The Indian Wars.

With the reduction of the Regular Army after the Civil War and the reorganization of 1869 four regiments of colored troops were formed in the Regular Army, the 26th and 25th Infantry, the 9th and 10th Cavalry. Their officers have been white, except in a few scattered instances. These regiments participated in several of the Indian Campaigns and Skirmishes. Their service was creditable.

Conclusions.

The negro organizations always consisted of small companies and troops commanded by experienced white officers and in the ranks were many noncommissioned officers and soldiers of long service. Habits of discipline and confidence in their officers was largely responsible for their good service.

Spanish American War.

On the outbreak of war there were four regular regiments in the service, the 24th and 25th Infantry, the 9th and 10th Cavalry. These had white
Officers throughout, while in the ranks were noncommissioned officers, most of whom had several enlistments; and indeed many of the private soldiers also had long service. All four of these regiments participated in the Santiago Campaign, suffered losses and all did good service according to all reports.

In addition to the regular regiments five State volunteer regiments and four so-called Immune Regiments were raised. None of these regiments had active service. Most of these volunteer regiments had white officers in the higher grades, but a few had colored officers throughout. As these did not get into action no opportunity was given to test their combat value.

Conclusions.

No separate organization larger than a regiment of colored troops participated in the war. Even these regiments were approximately the size of a battalion under our modern system of organization. The character of leadership of white officers, the length of service of the enlisted men, the discipline of the regular troops and the offensive character of the campaigns against a much inferior enemy did not put the negro troops to the severe test that modern war would demand of the hastily raised troops that compose a national army. While the service of the colored regular regiments was satisfactory, it is far from conclusive as to what might be expected of new troops under more trying conditions and less efficient leadership.

Philippine Insurrection.

All four of the regular regiments participated at some time in the campaign against the Philippine Insurgents. None of them were present during the earlier months when the organized armies of the Insurrectos were in the field. The personnel of these regiments was practically the same type as during the Spanish war.

In addition two volunteer regiments, the 43rd and 49th were raised and saw service. In these the company officers were colored, being chosen largely from the noncommissioned officers of the regular regiments. All field and staff officers were white, the former being Regular Army officers.

While all colored troops saw service they did not suffer any serious losses. A number of officers have commented on the fact that where there was more or less continual sniping at sentries, particularly at night, the morale of the colored troops became appreciably lower than that in white organizations. There was also a tendency to affiliate with the natives, and there were some desertions to the insurgents.

Conclusions.

The character of service of the colored troops in the Philippines was not such that definite conclusions could be drawn as to their value as modern combat soldiers.

The World War.

During the World War, 367,710 negroes were inducted into the service
of the United States. They were organized into service and labor battalions, pioneer regiments of infantry; into one complete division, the 92nd, and the so-called 93rd Division which in fact consisted of four separate infantry regiments. These two divisions were the only colored combat troops that actually saw front line service. The history of these two organizations is of particular importance as the facts are easily accessible and offer first-hand evidence of the action of negro troops in modern combat, when organized in large units.

Briefly, the history of the 92nd Division is as follows: Organization started October 26, 1917, in seven different cantonments. The General Field and Staff officers were white, chosen from the Regular Army; originally company officers of infantry, artillery, (except the heavy regiment) engineers and machine gun units were colored, most of them graduates from the colored training camp at Des Moines, Iowa. Prior to departure from the United States the inefficiency of the negro officers of artillery caused them to be replaced by whites; and this was also done in the Engineers on arrival in France. It may be stated here that the colored officers training camp was for infantry, and that many of the candidates were ex-noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army. It is a fact attested by all that the educational qualifications of these negro officers were far below the standards required for white officers. The enlisted personnel was well above the average run of the draft due to selective methods. Particularly was this true in the heavy artillery regiment and the Signal Battalion where efforts were made to have specially qualified men inducted into the service.

The division was brought to full strength just before embarkation, and sailed for France in June, 1918, where it went into a training area and spent seven weeks, the training being assisted by the assignment of a number of French officers and noncommissioned officers. From there it went on the line in the quiet St. Die Sector, remaining until September 20, when it was withdrawn and by rail and bus proceeded to the Argonne and became reserve for the 1st American Corps. One regiment, the 368th Infantry, was detached for duty as liaison group under the French 36th Corps and operated between that Corps and the left of the American forces. It was the only regiment that actually participated in the battle. A detailed study of its action has been made by the Historical Section of the Army War College. It is enough to say that it was on the line from September 26 to September 29, that it failed to make its objectives, withdrew without orders and became badly demoralized. The regimental commander showed that the principal cause of the failure was the inefficiency of the colored officers, and requested that 35 of them be removed for inefficiency and cowardice. Five of them were later convicted by General Court Martial for cowardice. The entire division was withdrawn and sent to the Marbache Area, another quiet sector. Here it remained until after the Armistice, taking part in the attacks of the 2d Army on November 10 and 11, operations of a minor character, but in which the division made an advance of about 2 kilometers, but nowhere was serious resistance encountered. The division showed a marked improvement over its work in the Argonne. The artillery which joined the divisions in the Marbache Sector gave fairly efficient support.

Of the various units in the division, the artillery and engineers had a fair degree of efficiency. The trains were well handled and transportation kept in better condition than in most white organizations. The Signal
Battalion was never equal to its task due to inability to obtain electricians, radio and telegraph operators. The infantry was never to be considered first-class. The Commander of the French Division under whom the 368th operated reported it as useless for combat.

A great deal of dissatisfaction among the negro soldiers and officers was fomented by negro agitators and magazines which continually attempted to force the race issue and bring forward claims for social equality.

To summarize, the 92d Division failed as a first-class combat unit, but nevertheless performed useful service on the defensive in quiet sectors.

The 93d Division consisted of the 369th, 370th, 371st and 372d Infantry Regiments. They were detached for duty with the French Army and always operated as parts of the French Division. The 369th was originally the 15th New York and had a number of colored officers, all of whom were ultimately removed, some of them being sent to the 92d Division. The 370th, a former Illinois National Guard regiment, during active service was commanded by a regular officer of long service with colored troops. In the 371st all officers were white. In the 372d originally there were many colored officers but most of these were ultimately eliminated. These four regiments saw service and did creditable work as combat troops, but according to reports were not as efficient as our white troops nor the French.

Conclusions.

1. The large number of negroes inducted into the service as a result of the draft necessitated their being organized into various types of units. The demand for service troops and labor troops was met by assignment of many of the uneducated ignorant negroes. The 92d Division was organized as a result of political pressure upon the administration. Political consideration also caused the formation of the negro training camp and the commissioning of some six hundred as officers.

2. As combat troops under modern war conditions they never rose to the standard of white units even when well led by white officers. The negro officers were educationally and in character far inferior to the whites, and troops under negro officers were unfit for battle against an aggressive active enemy.

3. As non-combatants in service and labor units and as drivers of animal and motor transports they did good service.

4. When grouped into units larger than a regiment they did not succeed, as thereby they lost touch with and sight of white troops as examples and supports.

5. No attempt was made to group negroes and whites in the same units, except that in some service units white noncommissioned officers were used as overseers, and successfully.
8. One of the most striking and significant features of the employment of negro soldiers, in all of the countries considered, is the uniform and emphatic conviction that negro troops are efficient and dependable only so long as led by capable white officers and noncommissioned officers. The reasons for this are not generally discussed in the references consulted, but may be ascribed to the following:

(a) Low intellectual capacity.
(b) Insufficient technical education.
(c) Lack of leading men of officer material.
(d) Lack of confidence of colored troops in officers of their own race.
(e) The questionable wisdom of training military leaders for armed peoples of a race, in their present development, who are not considered capable of exercising beneficial control in their various communities.

IV. Conclusions.

In addition to certain special conclusions appearing in the discussion, the following general conclusions are drawn from the study:

1. That negro troops, in countries other than the United States, are employed largely for the protection and police of colonial possessions. In France they are employed to augment the insufficient manpower and ease the financial burden of national defense.

2. That negro troops in the United States are employed in war both from political reasons and from the standpoint that the negro citizen should share the responsibilities, burdens and dangers of the war-time activities of his country.

3. That under efficient white leadership negro troops have done effective combat service.

4. Under negro officers they have displayed entire inaptitude for modern battle. Their natural racial characteristics, lack of initiative and tendency to become panic stricken, can only be overcome when they have confidence in their leaders.

5. They are much more susceptible to panic and their morale is quickly lowered when they come under shell fire or suffer physical hardships.

6. Their principal use during the World War was that for which they are best fitted, i.e., as service and labor troops, but with selected men under competent leadership they will become useful combat troops but not equal to American white soldiers.
(b) Extracts of Statement made by organization commanders of negro units relative to service of negro combat troops in France.

"I would not recommend the organization of colored units larger than the regiment. Colored troops to compare favorably with white troops must have better leadership than the whites."

Chief of Staff - 92d Div.
"If negro organizations must be formed, it would be better to add to every division of infantry an extra regiment - actually making it a service regiment. The negro will stand if led by white officers, but only to the point where they will have to suffer heavy losses under severe physical strain."

C. G. 183d Brigade - 92d Div.
"Negroes should be organized in small bodies with plenty of white superintendence. When assigned to larger units they should be distinctly in the minority. Grouped as a race they should preferably be used for non-combat service."

C. O. 365th Infantry
"The negro is unfitted as a combat soldier. The following is a verified actual incident. A white Major 92d Division thought it was best to take his blanket and go up to his front lines. In the morning he found his battalion circled around him."

"Negroes may be used with safety to form combat units providing they are officered entirely by white men and provided they are subjected to a period of training at least twice as long as is considered necessary in the training of white troops - otherwise they should be used as pioneer or labor troops."

C. O. 367th Infantry
"As fighting troops, the negro must be rated as second class material, this due primarily to his inferior intelligence and lack of mental and moral qualities."

C. O. 368th Infantry
"As a soldier the negro is absolutely dependent upon the leadership of white officers. Owing to the heavy casualties among officers of combat units it would be a dangerous situation were the officers to become casualties. I consider the negro should not be used as a combat soldier."

C. O. 370th Infantry
"The nucleus was the 8th Illinois Infantry. The conduct of the men was for the most part good. There was a large amount of illiteracy, which complicated the non-commissioned officer problem. I favor no larger unit than a regiment. The majority were willing to follow an officer anywhere and at any time."
C. O. 371st Infantry

"In a future war the main use of the negro should be in labor organizations. Before leaving for France a request for 25% extra officers was granted and permitted the greatest use of white leadership."

C. O. 372d Infantry

"My observation of the negro soldier leads me to believe that his services would be best utilized with labor troops or pioneer engineers. If circumstances require them to be organized into combat organizations, then combatant officers should all be white - also the noncommissioned officers."

C. O. 317th Engineers

"After the negro lieutenants of the regiment were replaced by white the improvement was such that its efficiency was but little less than that of the average white engineer regiment."

C. G. 167th FA Brigade

"As motor mechanics, both in their handling the tractors and trucks, the negroes were, in my opinion, fully as good if not better than white troops. In regard to personal equation it was my feeling that the men, if properly led were equal to any task to which they were set."

C. O. 350th FA

"The men compared better than favorably with the white brigade as regards to exposure to influenza and pneumonia. The conduct of the regiment under shell fire was satisfactory. The presence of a large body of discontented negroes in the U.S. trained in the use of arms offers an inviting field for enemy propaganda."

C. O. 351st FA

"I believe the artillery of the 92d Division made good in every way while at the front. In general colored troops should be used as labor units with the ultimate goal of front line troops for the most trustworthy and intelligent."

(c) Certain papers concerning the negro soldier as handled by officers of important positions in the War Department.

Papers attached - some parts particularly confirm the suggested conclusions.
REFERENCE "C"

THE NEGRO OFFICER

I. Combat Weaknesses.

The Negro officer in combat showed the following weaknesses mentioned by a great majority of the commanders of Negro units in combat.

a. They cliqued together and sought at all times to protect members of their own race, no matter whether they were right or wrong.

b. Their principal idea was not that they were in the service to fight for their country, but that they were there for the advancement of their racial interests.

c. They showed a lack of mental capacity for command.

d. They showed a lack of courage in the one engagement of the 368th Infantry, 31 of 91 officers were reported as either shamefully leaving the firing line or displaying incompetence in the combat - 5 were sentenced by G.C.M. to be shot for convicted cowardice (President disapproved proceedings).

e. The Negro soldier utterly lacked confidence in his colored officer.

f. Negro officers had no confidence in each other, nor did they always obey each other.

g. As a class the Negro officer was more concerned about personal appearance and having a good time than about proper performance of his duties.

h. In most instances the Negro officer was the first to go to the rear and abandon his men at the first signs of artillery or machine gun fire, leaving the men to shift for themselves.

i. In general the Negro officer was still a Negro, with all the faults and weaknesses of character inherent in the Negro race, exaggerated by the fact that he wore an officer's uniform.

II. The Colored Officers Training Camp.

1. The colored officers as supplied by Camp Dodge, judged by subsequent examination and test, were not properly trained, and had not been given sufficient written examinations to determine their suitability as officers. It must be remembered that the Negro can memorize drill regulations and theoretical principles by the yard, and repeat it all verbatim, but without the least understanding what it means. The previous record of these men was not such as would indicate that they would always have the moral stamina necessary to lead men in action. In fact, they were poor colored officers and not the best obtainable. The comparative intelligence rating of these candidates is as follows:
Comparative Rating - White and Negro Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>No. of Cases</th>
<th>Superior A &amp; B</th>
<th>Average C, C, &amp; D</th>
<th>Inferior D &amp; D-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White - Rep. of entire country</td>
<td>93,793</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18,901</td>
<td>.7#</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"National Academy of Sciences - Memoirs - page 707"  
# Only .1 in "A" grade-Officer Type, i.e.: 1/10 of 1 percent.

Comparative Rating - White and Negro Officer Tr. Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>No. of Cases</th>
<th>Superior A &amp; B</th>
<th>Average C, C &amp; C-</th>
<th>Inferior D &amp; D-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro Officers, Camp Dodge</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Officers, Training Camp Fourth Series - all camps</td>
<td>9,026</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"National Academy of Sciences - Memoirs - pages 735 and 863."

2. If it is seriously proposed to have combat colored officers then they should attend camps with white candidates, but grouped separately, and be forced to measure up to the same standards as the white, both as to entrance requirements and graduation (this was not done during the World War). Since the tests show that only 1/10 of 1 percent have the mental qualifications, a strict single standard would not produce more than 400 Negroes for combat assignment at the utmost. If it can be shown that the Negro is given an equal opportunity with the white man to qualify for commissioned grades, and that only his own lack of qualifications prevent his commission in the higher grades or in combat units, then social and political demands of the administration can be resisted.

III. Reserve and National Guard Negro Officers.

1. From data furnished by the Adjutant General and the Militia Bureau as of October 28, 1925, the following is the status of Reserve and National Guard Officers (Negro):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Col.</th>
<th>Lt.</th>
<th>Col. Maj.</th>
<th>Capt.</th>
<th>1st Lt.</th>
<th>2nd Lt.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard Officers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. A temporary embarrassment will occur in the drafting of a certain few National Guard colored units which now have Negro officers. A solution may be found in the employment of these units in the zone of the Interior until such time as the machinery of reclassification, separation, etc., is in operation. Negroes in the Reserve Corps holding commissions should be assigned to non-combat units of Negro personnel.
In time of peace the number of Negro reserve officers should be limited by every means consistent with impartiality.

3. The Negro has been a failure as a combat officer and if given another opportunity to make good he should be held to the strictest accountability divorced from all sentiment and based on his ability to compete with the white officer. If in time of peace he is not competent to hold offices which would call for some of the qualities expected of an officer of the army, then he can not hope to have a double standard with lower qualifications in war, when the fate of the nation is at stake. The Negro has no right to expect preferential treatment over the Jew, Italian or other race - only efficiency and leadership must be recognized.

IV. Extracts from reports on Negro Officers submitted by Competent Army Officers who Tried Them Out in France.

Division Commanding General, 92nd Division:
"The mass of colored troops distrusted their colored officers – to them the colored officer was simply a "stuck-up" nigger – thus the Negro officer was handicapped by the prejudices of his own race."

Chief of Staff, 92nd Division:
"I do not remember in thirteen months service a single report coming from a Negro officer that ever gave sufficient information to base any plan thereon, and practically every report had to be checked up by some white officer."

Commanding General, 183d Infantry Brigade:
"The Negro officers did not take proper care of their men. They not only lacked initiative but lacked standing with their own men."

Commanding General, 184th Infantry Brigade:
"The Negro as an officer is a failure, and this applies to all classes of Negro officers, whether from Regular Arm or from Officers' Training Camp."

Commanding Officer, 368th Infantry:
"I wish to go on record as expressing my opinion that colored officers as a class, are unfit to command troops in present-day warfare."

I.G.D. of Negro Division:
"The replacement of the combat colored officers of the 372nd Infantry by white officers had, for its effect, a better state of morale and discipline throughout the regiment; better instruction and better tactical control."
Commanding Officer, 317th Engineers:
"The improvement of the regiment upon the change from Negro lieutenants to white was phenomenal."

Commanding Officer, 370th Infantry:
"There were some good officers - hardworking and reliable men."

Commanding General, 1067th FA Brigade:
"The few battery officers did not last through the training period."

V. Important War Department papers concerning the Negro officer. Papers follow.
EXECUTIVE ORDER

1942

DEFINING POLICY OF FAIR PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE PROGRAM BY ALL PERSONS, RESIDENTS OF \( \text{REMAINDER OF ORDER HERE} \)

PURPOSE: To encourage full participation of all citizens of the United States, regardless of their race, creed, color, or national origin, in the defense program. To this end, all citizens are encouraged to participate on a voluntary basis in the Armed Forces and to work in defense industries. The goal is to ensure equal opportunity for all citizens in the defense program, without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as the President of the United States, I do hereby direct the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to take all necessary steps to ensure that the defense program is conducted in a manner that fully and completely adheres to the principles of equal opportunity for all citizens, regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin.

First, all departments and agencies of the Government of the United States shall adopt and implement policies and procedures to ensure that all employees have access to all positions and assignments, and that they are evaluated and promoted according to their qualifications and performance.

Second, all defense contracts and agreements shall be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin.

Third, all military services, defense contracts, and agreements shall be conducted in a manner that fully and completely adheres to the principles of equal opportunity for all citizens, regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin.

I direct the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to take all necessary steps to ensure that the defense program is conducted in a manner that fully and completely adheres to the principles of equal opportunity for all citizens, regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin.

Given at the City of Washington, this 19th day of November, in the year of our Lord, nineteen forty-two.
5. There is established in the Office of Production Management a Committee on Paid Leave, to consist of a representative of the United States Department of Labor, a representative of the Federal Labor Relations Authority, and five others appointed by the President. The Committee is to be responsible for the administration of the provisions of this section relating to paid leave. The Committee shall establish rules and regulations for such purposes as it may deem necessary. The Committee shall make recommendations to the President, through the Secretary of Labor, for the establishment of additional paid leave, and for the adjustment of amounts of leave to be paid out or to be distributed. The Committee shall also make recommendations to the President, through the Secretary of Labor, for the establishment of additional paid leave, and for the adjustment of amounts of leave to be paid out or to be distributed. The Committee shall also make recommendations to the President, through the Secretary of Labor, for the establishment of additional paid leave, and for the adjustment of amounts of leave to be paid out or to be distributed.
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1942

My dear Miss Fally:

I am enclosing a copy of a supplemental Intelligence Report "White Attitudes Toward Negroses" prepared for the Director of the Office of War Information.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

E. Smith Kane
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Fally
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Some of the historical documents contained in this curriculum guide reflect deep-seated and disturbing racial prejudices regarding African-Americans that were common among many white Americans in the early and middle years of the twentieth century. It is important to remember that these documents must be viewed in the context of their own time. While offensive to modern readers, they help us understand the intense opposition the Rosenbergs and the Tuskegee Airmen faced over the issue of allowing black men to pilot military aircraft. PPR Presidential Library and Museum
Some of the historical documents contained in this curriculum guide reflect deep-seated and disturbing racial prejudices regarding African-Americans that were common among many white Americans in the early and middle years of the twentieth century. It is important to remember that these documents must be viewed in the context of their own time. While offensive to modern readers, they help us understand the intense opposition the Roosevelts and the Tuskegee Airmen faced over the issue of allowing black men to pilot military aircraft. FDR Presidential Library and Museum

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD NEGROES

CONFIDENTIAL

The document contains information relating to the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage act as amended, U.S. Code 50, Sections 31 and 32. reproduction of any portion of this document in any manner is prohibited by law.

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE
COPY No. 3
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SUMMARY

White people are largely unaware of the fact that dissatisfaction is so widespread among Negroes that large numbers of them have no heart for the war. Six whites in ten, out of a national cross-section recently interviewed, felt that Negroes were pretty well satisfied with conditions. Almost as many felt that Negroes are now better off than they were before the war.

More than half of those interviewed with an opinion on the question believed that Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get jobs in war plants. Three out of four respondents in the South and nine out of ten in the rest of the country felt that a Negro should draw the same pay as a white person when he does the same work.

Fifty-five per cent of the sample believed that a Negro makes as good a soldier as a white man. Forty-nine per cent felt that he makes as good an airplane pilot. Respondents were about equally divided on the question of whether Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get ahead in the armed forces.

Whites showed a fairly good knowledge of the hopes and demands of Negroes. They recognized, for example, that what Negroes are most concerned about is improvement in their economic situation. But relatively few whites were willing to make concessions in this area. They were willing, however, to provide better housing facilities for Negroes.

On all of these issues pronounced regional differences were evident. Southerners were more inclined than people in the rest of the country to feel that Negroes are being treated fairly or are themselves to blame for any differentiation in the treatment accorded them. And they were less willing than people in other regions to make concessions to Negroes.

In all parts of the country, however, large numbers of people were unsympathetic to Negroes. Not only were they cold to their aspirations; many evidently felt that rights long since granted to Negroes should be revoked. For example, more than half of all respondents in the Northeast and West believed that there should be separate schools for white and Negro children.

Educational status also affected people's answers. On most questions the better educated were somewhat more realistic and more liberal than the less well educated.

Finally, it was found that people's views on the Negro's role in the war effort were closely linked to their prejudices on segregation and their desire to maintain present caste distinctions.
"I note with satisfaction that the theme of your significant gathering reads 'Victory is Vital to Minorities.' This theme might well be reversed and given to the Nation as a slogan. For today, as never before in our history, 'Minorities Are Vital to Victory.'"

"We are, in a sense, a Nation of minorities. By race, by religion, by color, by ancestry, each constituent group is a minority when viewed in relation to our total population. But it is the essence of our democracy that our very differences have welded us into a Nation. And the democratic way of life within that Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders."

--Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Conference, July 11, 1942

WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD NEGROES

The amount of support Negroes give the war effort—and their very desire to support it—depends to a very large extent upon the attitudes of white people toward them. Negroes cannot put their shoulders to the wheel in the war effort if they are not permitted to do so. And their morale is inevitably affected by the kind of treatment they experience.

It is important, therefore, to see to what extent white Americans share the view of their President that the support of the nation's Negroes is vital to the war effort. To supplement its previous investigations of Negro morale, the Bureau of Intelligence conducted a survey of white attitudes toward Negroes. Interviews were conducted with a representative cross section of white people in all parts of the country between June 22 and July 7.
I. Basic Attitudes Toward Negroes

Perhaps the most surprising finding of the entire investigation was that a majority of white Americans are unaware that there is anything that might be called a "Negro problem." The illustration below shows the range of responses to the question, "Do you think most Negroes are pretty well satisfied with things in this country, or do you think most of them are dissatisfied?"

**ARE NEGROES GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH CONDITIONS?**

- **Satisfied**
  - 28%
  - 9%

- **Dissatisfied**
  - 23%
  - 11%

- **Don't know**
  - 6%
  - 3%

Previous investigations of Negro morale in Memphis and New York indicate that, in fact, Negroes are far from satisfied. Many of them have grievances. Some of them feel so badly about their present situation, and so discouraged about the future, that they do not think that they would be any worse off if Japan won the war. A few feel they would be no worse off under German domination. Views of Negroes in these two cities cannot be taken as indices of national sentiment, but studies in four other cities suggest that they are not unrepresentative.

The opinion of six white people in ten that Negroes are reasonably well satisfied with their situation must, therefore, be attributed to very large measure to ignorance. But many factors contribute to this ignorance—including the
cavalier belief that Negroes do not need much to satisfy them. It is in the South, where discrimination is most marked and Negroes constitute a relatively large proportion of the population, that the comforting opinion that Negroes are satisfied is most prevalent.

Opportunities Open to Negroes

The beliefs whites have about Negroes tend to bolster one another. Some light is shed on the opinion that Negroes are relatively well satisfied with conditions by the response of white people to the question, "Do you think Negroes are getting all the opportunities they deserve in this country, or do you think in general they are not being treated fairly?"

ARE NEGROES GETTING ALL THE OPPORTUNITIES THEY DESERVE?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>33%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The belief that Negroes are getting all the opportunities they deserve is itself a product of ignorance and a disparaging attitude toward Negroes. As the chart shows, the belief is more widespread in the South than in other parts.
of the country; it is more frequently expressed by those who did not complete high school than it is by the relatively well educated. But the belief is prevalent in all parts of the country, among the well educated and the poorly educated. Eighty-four per cent of the poorly educated respondents in the South subscribe to it, but so do more than one half of the well-educated respondents in the North who have an opinion on the question.

The extent to which ignorance of the facts contributes to the viewpoint is perhaps suggested by peoples' opinions on a more specific question, "Do Negroes have as good a chance as white people to get a good education?" In the Northeast and in the West eight out of ten respondents felt that Negroes in their own regions have as good a chance as whites to get a good education. And the majority of white Southerners maintained that Negroes enjoy equality of educational opportunity in their region.

Whatever the facts may be about the Northeast and the West, the opinion that Negroes have equal educational opportunities in the South is demonstrably mistaken. Because there are separate schools for the two races, it is possible to make direct statistical comparisons. In a recent year, in ten Southern states where Negroes constituted 28 per cent of the total school enrollment, only 18 per cent of the total expenditures went for Negro schools. The average expenditure per white pupil was $37.87; per colored pupil, $21.09. Only 29 per cent of the Negro children of high school age, as contrasted with 35 per cent of the white children, were enrolled in school.

Respondents in the Northeast and in the West, especially the better educated ones, showed some awareness of these inequalities in the southern part of the United States. When asked, "Are there any other parts of the country where
you feel Negroes do not have the same chances as white people do to get a good education?", six respondents in ten in the Northeast and West said, "Yes." It is interesting psychologically that those who acknowledged the existence of inequalities in their own areas were most prone to recognize the failure of other sections of the country to treat Negroes equitably.

**Views on Negroes' Ability**

A low opinion of Negroes' capabilities also probably contributes to the feeling that they are getting all the opportunities they deserve. As the chart on the following page shows, more than a half of all white people in the South and more than a third of all white people in the rest of the country feel that Negroes are primarily responsible for their inferior status in our society. The bottom half of the chart shows the shortcomings attributed to Negroes by those who hold this viewpoint.

Better educated respondents were more inclined than the less well educated to blame white people, or both whites and Negroes, for the fact that Negroes do not have equality of opportunity. Even in the South 43 per cent of the better educated respondents were willing to put all or part of the blame for the plight of Negroes on the shoulders of the white population.

The sample was asked: "In general, do you think Negroes are as intelligent as white people — that is, can they learn things just as well if they are given the same education and training?" Forty-eight per cent — a majority of those who expressed an opinion — replied that Negroes are not as intelligent as whites. As one would expect, this view was far more generally held in the South than in other regions. Surprisingly, it was voiced somewhat more frequently by the well educated than it was by the less well educated.

Whites put a somewhat more favorable appraisal on the potential ability
WHO IS TO BLAME FOR THE FACT THAT NEGROES DON'T HAVE THE SAME CHANCES AS WHITES?

- Whites: 34% (17%)
- Negroes: 16% (53%)
- Both: 16% (12%)
- Other causes and don't know: 14% (12%)

Opinions of whites
- Northeast and West
- South

IF NEGROES, WHY ARE THEY TO BLAME?

- Lack of native ability: 4%
- Laziness: 17%
- Aggressiveness: 3% (10%)
- Manners and morals: 4%
- Other causes: 5% (5%)
of Negroes as workers. When asked, "If a Negro has the same training as a white person, do you think he can do a particular job just as well?", seven respondents in ten in the Northeast and in the West said, "Yes". But less than 40 per cent of the Southerners interviewed shared this view.

In every region those who had worked with Negroes had more faith in their capabilities than those who had not.

Segregation

The views of whites on the segregation issues are summed up in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Northeast Edu-</th>
<th>Northeast Unedu-</th>
<th>South Edu-</th>
<th>South Unedu-</th>
<th>West Edu-</th>
<th>West Unedu-</th>
<th>Tota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cated</td>
<td>cated</td>
<td>cated</td>
<td>cated</td>
<td>cated</td>
<td>cated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate residential sections</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate restaurants</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate schools</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate sections in street cars and buses</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most marked differences of opinion are clearly on a regional basis. But it will be observed that large numbers of people in both the Northeast and the West expressed a preference for arrangements which would keep Negroes and whites separated. The sentiment for separate schools in these regions is especially surprising. Even though children of the two races customarily attend the same schools in the Northeast and West, except as they may be accidentally separated as a result of living in different areas, majority sentiment endorsed segregation.

* Completed high school or better.
Similarly, large numbers of people in these regions maintained that separate sections should be provided for whites and Negroes in public conveyances, even though this would involve a change in existing arrangements. Rural people were particularly prone to favor separate sections for whites and Negroes.

It would be clearly inaccurate to say that on the issue of segregation a tolerant North and West are arrayed against an intolerant South. Yet on each of the questions the proportion of those who plumped for a policy of segregation was markedly larger in the South. It is probable, too, that Southerners feel more intensely about the issue than people in the rest of the country. The sample was asked, "If a Negro with just as much education and income as you have moved into your block, would it make any difference to you?" Eighty-six per cent of those interviewed in the South, as compared with 54 per cent in the rest of the country, said that it would. The proportion of those who indicated that they would either actively oppose the encroachment of Negroes or else move away was also larger in the South.

On most issues it will be noted that well-educated respondents were somewhat more liberal than the less well educated. But the better educated respondents expressed more concern than those with less education about living in the same block with Negroes. In all probability, however, this difference was due to their superior economic status—to such considerations as fear of a decline in real estate values following Negro infiltration into their neighborhoods.

II. Negroes in the War Effort

The various attitudes which have been discussed inevitably find reflection in white people's views on the role of Negroes in the war effort and the impact of the war upon them.
Whites' ignorance of conditions among Negroes and their reluctance to see that there is any Negro problem may have something to do with the fact that 55 per cent of all those interviewed believed that Negroes have shared in the war-stimulated economic boom, and are better off than they were before December 7. In any case, as the chart below indicates, whites were significantly more inclined to hold this view than the Negroes in Memphis and New York.

**ARE NEGROES BETTER OFF SINCE THE WAR BEGAN?**

- **Better off**: 60%
- **Some**: 30%
- **Worse off**: 4%
- **Don't know**: 6%

Whites are less optimistic than Negroes about the effect of an American victory upon the status of Negroes, but the fact that they believe that Negroes have already improved their position may account for this. If, however, the view of seven white respondents in ten that the war will not change the status of the Negro in American society is based on a reluctance to make concessions, it may point to trouble ahead. For, if the New York and Memphis samples are typical, a sizeable minority of American Negroes believe that victory should and will mean some improvement in their lot.
Willingness to Make Concessions

The divergence between the kind of changes Negroes want made right now and the willingness of whites to make concessions constitute a more immediate source of conflict between the races. The issue about which Negroes feel the keenest resentment today is economic discrimination. They want to have the same opportunities as whites to secure jobs for which they are qualified. And they want to get the same pay as whites when they do the same work. Better economic opportunities are regarded as the key to the improvement of Negro life in all its aspects. About better houses and the abolition of segregation, Negroes show less concern.

As the charts on the opposite page show, on the whole whites assess the grievances of Negroes quite accurately. But despite the fact that they recognize the Negroes' desire for economic equality, there is a pronounced reluctance to make concessions in this area. On the other hand, whites are willing to act to improve Negro housing conditions, although they recognize that this is not the step which Negroes most desire.

The disparity between whites' knowledge of what Negroes want and what they are willing to grant them requires explanation. It may be conjectured that economic concessions are resisted because it is felt that they threaten existing caste barriers. On the other hand, better housing for Negroes fits in with the noblesse oblige tradition, which is particularly strong in the South, of "taking care" of Negroes. It permits the perpetuation of existing segregation. Finally, it is a way of improving the health of Negroes, and many whites have come to realize that the germs of communicable diseases do not obey Jim Crow laws and that Negroes' health is a matter of close personal concern to them.
WHAT WHITES THINK NEGROES WANT MOST NOW AND WHAT THEY ARE WILLING TO GRANT THEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NORTHEAST and WEST</th>
<th>SOUTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job equality</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal wages</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better houses</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No segregation</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- What whites think Negroes want most
- What whites are willing to grant
The Negro in War Production

Almost one-half of the cross section of white people expressed the belief that Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get jobs in war plants. (See chart opposite, page 12.) But the relatively well educated were not so likely to hold this opinion as the less well educated.

Those who believed that Negroes do not have as good a chance as whites to get war jobs were asked to tell who they thought was responsible for the situation. Regional differences sharply influenced their answers. Southerners thought that Negroes themselves deserve most of the blame for whatever difficulties they encounter. A plurality in the Northeast blamed the managers of factories; a plurality in the West blamed labor unions.

Nine out of ten respondents in the Northeast and the West, and three out of four in the South, said that a Negro doing the same work as a white person should draw the same pay. But some people, especially in the South, may have expressed this opinion secure in the knowledge that the issue was remote, since in all probability Negroes would not get the same jobs as whites.

Southerners were far more prone than people in other parts of the country to object violently to Negroes working alongside them. In the Northeast and in the West, only three respondents in ten said that it would make any difference to them if Negroes were hired to work with them. But seven Southerners in ten said that it would make a difference. And far more Southerners than Northerners or Westerners carried their opposition to the point of saying that they would quit their jobs if Negroes were hired to work with them.

There are some grounds for encouragement, however, in the fact that in all parts of the country those who had already worked with Negroes were far more willing to work alongside them than were those who had never had the experience.
NEGROES IN THE WAR EFFORT
Opinions of whites
Upper bar: NORTHEAST and WEST
Lower bar: SOUTH

"Do Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get war jobs?"

"Are Negroes as patriotic as whites?"

"Does the Negro make as good a soldier as the white man?"

"Does the Negro make as good an airplane pilot as the white man?"

"Do Negroes have the same chances as whites to get ahead in the armed forces?"

[Bar charts showing responses]

---

Yes  No  Don't know
The Negro in the Armed Forces

From two-thirds to three-fourths of the people interviewed in the Northeast and in the West believed that Negroes are just as patriotic as whites. But in the South a majority of respondents with an opinion on the subject maintained that they are not as patriotic.

The same regional differences were apparent in views on the Negro's ability as a soldier. Six out of ten respondents in the Northeast and in the West felt that the average Negro makes just as good a soldier as the average white man. But in the South a majority of respondents held the contrary opinion. Throughout the country even fewer people felt that the Negro makes a good airplane pilot. Most of those who were scornful of Negroes' fighting ability maintained that they are cowardly, have less native ability, or are lazy and lack initiative.

Respondents divided up into three groups of almost equal size on the question of who should lead Negro troops. Three in ten believed that they should be led by white officers, and almost the same number were of the opinion they should be led by Negro officers. Four respondents in ten felt that they should be led by both whites and Negroes.

The usual regional variations were apparent. In the Northeast and in the West the most popular view was that Negroes should be led by officers of both races. In these regions the second largest vote was for Negro officers, except in the rural West, where white officers were in second place. In the South the predominant opinion was that Negro troops should be led by white officers. A sizeable group felt that both white and Negro officers should be employed, but the comments volunteered by some of those who expressed this opinion indicated that they felt that the top officers should be whites and the minor officers, who have close contact with the troops, Negroes.
The task of making Americans generally see the importance of bringing the nation's Negro minority more fully into the war effort is one of immense difficulty. In part this difficulty stems from the close relationship between views on the Negro's role in the present emergency and deep-seated, stubbornly-held attitudes toward his worth, his ability and his place in society.

The task is national in scope. Although Southerners were more disparaging of Negroes than people in the rest of the country, and more reluctant to make concessions to them, large numbers of people in all regions showed what must be regarded as an illiberal attitude toward Negroes. On some issues, indeed, it appears that rights which have long since been granted to them are still opposed by large numbers of white people.

Despite these difficulties, the situation is by no means hopeless. There are promising possibilities, for example, in the fact that large numbers of white people recognize the need for improving Negro housing conditions.

Many of the attitudes of whites toward Negroes stem in part at least from ignorance. Thus a wide dissemination of information about the accomplishments of Negroes may be expected to do a great deal of good. Perhaps the most fundamental requirement for the solution of the Negro problem is further education of the white population.

Finally, the imperative need of expanding the labor force imposes an obligation on the Federal Government, and provides an opportunity, to encourage the wider employment of Negroes in American industry.

By turning the spotlight on Negro housing conditions and attempting to improve them; by making people aware of the necessity for employing more Negroes and attempting to eliminate employment discrimination; and by publicizing the
Accomplishments of Negroes, the Federal Government can simultaneously make progress towards immediate and long-term objectives. It can secure a fuller participation of Negroes in the war effort and raise Negro morale. And over a period of time it can develop greater good will toward Negroes among the white population.
This report is based on the following materials:

"White Attitudes Toward Negroes," (tables), Extensive Surveys Division, Special Report #11
"The Negro Problem," (comment on tables), Extensive Surveys Division
"Memphis Negroes and the War," (tables based on interviews with whites in Memphis), Extensive Surveys Division, Special Report #10
"White Attitudes Toward Negroes," Special Service Division, Report #19
"Negroes in The War: A Study in Baltimore and Cincinnati," Division of Surveys, Special Report #16
"Minority Groups in Baltimore and Cincinnati," Special Services Division, Report #18
Report on statements of private thought leaders and government spokesmen on Negroes, Sources Division, July 31, 1942
"Axis Propaganda Intended to Undermine Relations Between Whites and Negroes," Sources Division, July 21, 1942
"Negroes in A Democracy At War," Survey of Intelligence Materials #28, May 27, 1942
"Memphis Negroes and The War," Supplement to Survey #28, July 14, 1942

All of the above reports are available to authorized individuals through the Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information.
Dear Mrs. Roosevelt,

I got back from my furlough the other day and felt refreshed and rested. During my short leave I had an opportunity to go to Syracuse for a while and returned and saw "Tales of Manhattan", a very unusual story on the screen at Radio City Music Hall.

An announcement was made over the radio that you may go to England. I am praying that you will have a very safe journey and an enjoyable one too.

When I returned I expected to see the 99th and several units gone but it seems that they are not quite ready to leave yet. The pilots of the 99th look as though they have really mastered flying judging from the way they go into maneuvers.

While I was at home you asked me to let you know where the departing combat units go if possible. I have made an inquiry and was told that information cannot be given out, at least not until after the units' trip has been completed.

Today, there was a graduation of quite a few enlisted men of the 99th and other units that make up the group. It was very colorful.

I have had no word about my officer candidate school, application as yet.

I am interested to find out the results of the case you described to me. It's the one in which a soldier was taken off a train in Richmond when he refused to sit in the colored section and his father wrote to you about it.

Mrs. Roosevelt, little though it may be, if ever there is anything I can do for you I am always at your disposal regardless of what it is and when and if necessary, no one would be the wiser.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Petersen
COMMAND OF NEGRO TROOPS

WAR DEPARTMENT • 29 FEBRUARY 1944
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C., 29 February 1944.

War Department Pamphlet No. 20–6, Command of Negro Troops, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.
[A. G. 461 (1 Feb 44).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:\n
G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. Ulio,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Section I
Introduction

The purpose of this booklet is to help officers to command their troops more effectively by giving them information which will increase their understanding of their men.

Colored Americans, like all other Americans, have the right and duty to serve their country to the very best of their individual abilities. The Army has the right and duty to see to it that its personnel of all races do so serve. Furthermore the Selective Service Act requires that there will be no racial discrimination in the selection and training of men for military duty.

The same methods of discipline, training, and leadership apply to Negro troops that have proved successful with any other troops. Nevertheless, the Negro in the Army has special problems. This is the result of the fact that the Negro group has had a history materially different from that of the majority in the Army. Its average schooling has been inferior; its work has been generally less skilled than that of the white man; and its role in the life of the Nation has been limited. The following discussion is devoted to an examination of these special problems as they relate to military service, and to suggestions for their solution.
Section II
Negro Manpower

No statement beginning “All Negroes” is true, just as no statement beginning “All Frenchmen,” “All Chinese,” or “All Americans” is true.

A white soldier from California has problems of adjusting to Army life which differ from the problems of a white soldier from Maine or Florida. Likewise a Negro soldier from the rural areas has problems different from those of a Negro who has been graduated from city schools.

The period between World Wars I and II was one of unprecedented changes for the Negro population. During this period, there occurred the greatest single mass migration in American history. While the Negro population in the North was only 1,578,336 at the time of the 1910 census, the 1940 census showed 2,960,899 living there.

NEGROES IN TWO WARS

This shift in population shows up in the Army. One out of every three Negro soldiers in the Army today comes from North of the Mason and Dixon Line, while in World War I, only one Negro out of five was from the North.

One byproduct of this migration has been an increase in the Negro’s opportunity for education. The extent to which educational opportunity for Negroes has increased since 1918 is strikingly illustrated in the comparison of Negro soldiers by education in World Wars I and II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World War I</th>
<th>World War II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school graduates</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school nongraduates</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Northward and cityward migration was not, of course, the sole factor in raising the educational level of Negroes. The South, urban and rural, has taken great strides in improving its schools in the last 25 years.

These figures on the shift of Negroes from Southern rural to Northern urban localities and on the change in the level of education are cited because they show why Negro soldiers within the same regiment differ so widely in performance, in attitudes, and in their response to various leadership techniques. Knowledge that these differences are
usually the product of very different experiences helps officers to avoid difficulties and to secure a more hearty cooperation from Negro personnel.

Great as these changes have been since World War I, the average officer in command of Negro troops faces the fact that many of his soldiers—especially those from rural areas and also from the lower economic levels in cities—have had a very limited education as compared to white soldiers. Moreover, some of them have had very little opportunity to acquire through work experience the kind of skills which are most often used in their Army assignments. The differences between white and Negro soldiers in educational level are shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th></th>
<th>Negro</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school graduates</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school nongraduates</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is not an entirely accurate measure of education, since it does not allow for differences in length of school term for Negro and white pupils in some regions, or differences in the quality of schooling. Actually it understates the educational handicap of the Negro.

**NEGRO AND WHITE AGCT SCORES**

The very material differences between white and Negro soldiers in terms of knowledge and skills important to the Army is illustrated by their comparative performance on the Army General Classification Test. This test, given to all selectees at reception centers, is a roughly accurate measure of what the new soldier knows, what skills he commands, and of his aptitude in solving problems. It is not a test of inborn intelligence. Yet, it is the best single measure of the new soldier's military ability which is available to his officers. Enlisted men are classified in five categories (designated by roman numerals I through V) on the basis of their scores in this test. How colored and white soldiers are distributed in the five groups is shown in the following table based on inductions during a 6-month period in 1943.

**ARMY GENERAL CLASSIFICATION TEST**

Grade distributions for all white and colored men processed at reception centers during the period 1 January 1943 through 30 June 1943.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGCT Grades</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White:</td>
<td>102,143</td>
<td>490,330</td>
<td>532,215</td>
<td>413,005</td>
<td>65,818</td>
<td>1,593,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colored:</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>5,991</td>
<td>23,402</td>
<td>83,104</td>
<td>61,023</td>
<td>173,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assignment to class IV or V on the basis of a soldier's AGCT score is not to be accepted as evidence that a man is unteachable, but it does indicate that his training requires extra patience, skill, and understanding on the part of the instructor.

**PROBLEMS OF VOCABULARY**

One can visualize this problem a little more clearly by observing the handicap the class V man has in comprehending directions. The Research Branch of Morale Services Division gave a vocabulary test to class V men, Negro and white, in a replacement training center. Each man was asked to define 500 words occurring frequently in the Soldier's Handbook, the Soldier's Reader, Army Life, general orders, and bulletin board notices. Only half of the words were known to all the class V men studied. Examples of words which were not comprehended by 25 to 50 percent of the men are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Outpost</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Sentinel</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ornament</td>
<td>Chevrons</td>
<td>Observation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examples of words which were comprehended by less than 25 percent of the men are:

- Barrage
- Cadre
- Cantonment
- Counterclockwise
- Echelon
- Exterior
- Ordnance
- Personnel

**KNOW YOUR MEN**

It is highly important for commanding officers to know how their men rank in the Army General Classification Test in order that those in the lower ranges may be singled out for special instruction. The score of any soldier can be determined by reference to his Form 20 card, which is usually on file either in the company or the regimental headquarters. On this card is entered other information about the

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*Since illiteracy reflects lack of opportunity for education rather than lack of learning ability, the Army has provided an additional test for men who have difficulty reading or writing. This test, known as the II ABC Non-Language is usually administered in replacement training centers. As with the AGCT, the men taking the test are classified in five groups on the basis of their scores, the five roman numerals having the same relative value. The results tend to sort out those men with a high degree of native intelligence but inadequate schooling from those in the lower ranges of native ability. The scores are entered on the Form 20 card and, where available, provide an additional aid to officers. A shift from V on the AGCT to I, II, or III in the non-language test marks a man with potential ability who is well worth special attention, and who, if encouraged to surmount the disadvantages of inadequate formal education, may prove to be a real asset to his unit and to the Army.*
soldier which his officers should know—his age, marital status, years of schooling, place of birth, employment record, hobbies and interests, etc. Company officers who feel it important to know their men and the particular problems and capacities of each individual in the unit, make a practice of studying these cards.

Knowing that men with little formal education (i.e., the AGCT IV’s and V’s) are more apt to go AWOL and to contract V.D., conscientious company commanders take particular pains to see that these men understand the seriousness of such conduct. These men must be taught the inevitable consequences of “going over the hill,” both by simple-language explaining of penalties involved and by firm, impartial imposition of proper penalties, exactly as would be done in the case of soldiers of better education. Special care must be taken also to see that these men understand the hazards of infection and realize the necessity for prophylactic treatment.

Within practical limits, conscientious commanders also see that the most intelligent and responsible Negroes are given a good chance to earn promotion, and that all job assignments are matched as closely as possible to the capacities and employment experience of the individual as revealed on his Form 20 card.

All of these common-sense measures apply to white troops as well as Negroes. But the fact that a Negro company is likely to have a much larger proportion of class IV and V men, along with some Negroes of marked ability, justifies special attention by the company commander to individual differences in ability and training.

**SPECIAL TRAINING UNITS**

Special training units have been developed for illiterate and semiliterate men, non-English-speaking soldiers, and others having somewhat limited mental ability. The primary purpose of special training is to provide those literacy skills which will enable the men to pursue regular training with success.

A directive was issued in the spring of 1943 indicating that special training units would be located in reception centers after 1 June 1943. The purpose of this directive was to encourage the early identification and immediate training of men in need of basic literacy skills. By providing such training at the reception center level, organizations, unit training centers, and replacement training centers will be relieved from expending regular training effort on recruits who cannot absorb such training. There are still special training centers. However, the number of men being trained in such units is decreasing, while the units in reception centers are gradually building up to their full trainee strength.

Officers in charge of Negro troops who discover men in their units who are unable to read and write English at a fourth-grade level, who
are unable to speak or understand simple English, or who are classified in class V in the Army General Classification Test may take one of the following steps to provide for these men:

a. If the men were processed through a reception center without passing through a Special Training Unit they may be returned to the nearest reception center for special training under the provisions of letter AG 353 (24 Jul 43) OB-D-SPGAP.

b. Literacy classes may be established for the men. Such classes should be operated in addition to the regular training program and, in most cases, should be evening classes. Instructional materials for such classes may be obtained from the Adjutant General, Attention: Training Branch, The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

c. Those men who do not evidence aptness for military training may be discharged from the Army under the provisions of section VIII, paragraph 52a, AR 615–360.

The performance of Negro soldiers on mechanical-aptitude tests is on the average markedly inferior to that of white soldiers. This is to be expected, since Negroes as a whole have not had opportunities nearly equal to those available to white men to gain mechanical experience. The three basic points for the commanding officer to bear in mind in this connection are: (1) That a Negro unit may not be expected to contain as great a proportion of men with mechanical skills of potential military value, (2) that there are nevertheless likely to be a few men with mechanical skill who must not be overlooked just because they are more rare than in a white unit of comparable size, and (3) that if men with mechanical skill are needed they can usually be developed with careful selection and training.

It is this recognition of individual differences and planned systematic effort to take these differences into account which distinguishes the successful commander of Negro troops from the officer who thinks that all Negroes are alike and all inferior.

**GOOD SOLDIERS ARE MADE, NOT BORN**

It is alleged by some that the Negro cannot be reliable in battle, because his race lacks the necessary qualities as a matter of heredity. Many Negroes, like any other people, do lack soldierly skills. But insofar as this belief assumes that there are some mysterious inborn factors—such as courage, fear, or a fighting heart—whose presence or absence is a matter of racial inheritance, it is enough to say that there is no scientific evidence whatever to support such a view. In all the vast number of studies by psychologists and other scientists during the past two or
three decades, there is not one piece of research which proves that Negroes are, as a group, mentally or emotionally defective by heredity. All peoples seem to be endowed by nature about equally with whatever it takes to fight a good war, if they want to and have learned how. Among Negroes, as among white people, there is the widest range of individual abilities, and most of the less mentally alert in either race can be made to learn and to fight if properly led.

FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKES

When a conscientious officer has this understanding of the men whom it is his responsibility to train and lead, he is in a position to avoid both of the fundamental mistakes too often made by leaders of Negro troops. One mistake is to overestimate the abilities of his men to learn and perform; the other is to underestimate their abilities. In the first case, impatience leads often to friction and discouragement. But the need for patience does not imply need for lowering standards of ultimate proficiency and jeopardizing the Army through inadequate training of any of its units. There is no place in this Army for the attitude, “These men are so limited in ability that there is no use trying to make good soldiers of them.” This attitude—held even by some officers with a sincere but mistaken sense of fairness to the Negro—encourages laxness of discipline and is fatal to successful training. Steering a course between the two dangers of overestimating or underestimating his men, the commanding officer can bring through training and to the theater of operations a unit which will be a credit to him and to the Army.

RACIAL THEORIES WASTE MANPOWER

Waste of Negro manpower through ineffective military training, inefficient assignment, and poor leadership born of a failure to appreciate and deal with special problems, is no less costly than the purposeless destruction of munitions. Officers at all levels of command can reduce such waste by remembering that effective command cannot be based on racial theories. The Germans have a theory that they are a race of supermen born to conquer all peoples of inferior blood. This is nonsense, the like of which has no place in the Army of the United States—the Army of a Nation which has become great through the common effort of all peoples. In our Army each man must demonstrate his capacity to acquire the needed skills. Each man should be given work and responsibility in line with his proven worth. Men with skills of military value which cannot be used in their outfits should be transferred to units where they can be used, even though this may involve considerable trouble for the responsible officer. Any other course would be a waste of manpower.
Upon the company commander falls the definite and heavy responsibility to know his men, to assign them where they can be most useful, to promote them on the basis of true worth. Upon him is the responsibility for a fair and impartial discipline and for a fair and intelligent granting of such privileges as furloughs. It is not enough for the company commander to carry out these responsibilities. He should see that his junior officers also know their men. Unless they have this knowledge and unless they apply it properly, the morale and efficiency of their outfits may be seriously impaired. Higher commanders cannot afford to run the risk of seeing junior officers destroy morale through actions based on discarded racial theories. No officer should make the mistake of thinking that he can really get to know his men by even the most faithful discharge of formal duties in the course of the day's routine activities. Leadership of men in war is a 24-hour job.
Section III
Problems of Command

The white commander of Negro troops faces special problems in understanding his men. These difficulties result partly from the fact that his background and experience, both civilian and military, are apt to be different from theirs. Even more they are a product of the men’s reluctance or even inability to be entirely frank with their white officers. This difficulty of communication across the race line is an inevitable result of the Negro’s experience that frank expression of opinions is apt to lead to punishment of one kind or another.

Furthermore, the commander can ill afford to lean too heavily upon the advice of other officers or civilians who claim to possess a special insight into the “Negro mind.” It is entirely unlikely that such advisers have any better basis for judgment than has the commander. A sure sign of inaccuracy is the tendency of such “experts” to depend on generalities. It is just as untrue to say that “All Negroes believe such and such” as to say that all Negroes have certain mental or physical traits.

Negro soldiers, like white, grumble and complain about things they do not like. When the occasion seems suitable, they try to do something about it. The long history of disadvantage and discrimination to which they have been exposed gives many of them sound reason for complaint. The Army inherits, but has no right to pass judgment on, accumulated complaints based on civilian experience. The Negro soldiers form an important force, and it is with the proper utilization of that force that the commander is concerned.

CONFLICTS OF NEGRO ATTITUDES

The mixed, conflicting feelings of the Negro soldier about his relation to the war are, in a way, typical of the feelings of Negroes in general about their position as citizens of the United States. Most Negro civilians are as American in their pride of country, in the way they want to live, and even in their prejudices, as are most whites. At the same time, they do not like the way their status as Negroes has limited their participation in the life of the country, has restricted their jobs, housing, and recreation, and has directed the prejudices of other people against them.

The wartime symbol for this two-sided line of thought is found in the response of many Negroes to the “V for victory” slogan. Among
Negroes arose a “double V” campaign: One V for victory in the war and a second V for victory in improved conditions for Negroes on the home front.

The commander of Negro troops must be aware of this conflict of ideas within the Negro group, and within the mind of many an individual Negro soldier. Acceptance of the war by the majority, and a high level of adjustment to Army life, are sources of strength. Doubts and distrust are threats to efficiency. They are handicaps to military success which, like inadequate education, are more often found among Negro than among white soldiers; and commanders of Negro troops are responsible for lessening such handicaps.

Although doubts about the cause for which they fight and about their personal stake in victory are encountered among some Negro soldiers, this does not mean that all Negro soldiers have such attitudes, and the commander should not assume that they exist until he discovers actual evidence. Neither does it mean that nothing can be done to win over men with such doubts. The commander must convince the doubters that they are wanted in the Army, that they will be used according to their abilities, and that they will be treated with justice as men and soldiers. Actions, not words, must be used to put across this idea.

The difference between the special problems of the Negro group and those of various white groups is one of degree, not of kind. Men of Greek, Italian, Latin American, French, or any other extraction have special problems. Even among native white soldiers, there are differences to be allowed for—differences in region of origin, in economic level, in educational attainments. The Tennessee mountaineer, the Vermont farmer, the Louisiana Cajun, the Pennsylvania German, the uneducated mill hand, the college-trained corporation executive, and many another type all have their special histories, attitudes, and ways of life.

The commander of Negro troops is not faced with a new and totally unknown problem. His task is simply to extend to a specific situation the teachings of everyday experience in the handling of men.

**NEGRO SOLDIERS ARE AMERICANS**

The Negroes in our Army are Americans in both thought and behavior, but Americans of any color are not cut to a single pattern. There is no reason why they should be, for this country prides itself upon a tradition of freedom for the individual to live his life as he desires, so long as he respects the rights of others. The Negro group is not unique in that many of its members have ideas of their own about what is proper and what is not, about what is insulting and what is just. Their history and the existing restrictions which limit their participation in the life of the community make it inevitable that most Negroes
will differ somewhat from white people in their sensitivities, thoughts, and actions.

This statement implies no criticism. It is made to call attention to those beliefs, attitudes, and traits most likely to cause trouble in the handling of Negro troops.

**CAUSES OF RESENTMENT**

Most Negroes resent any word or action which can be interpreted as evidence of a belief that they are by birth inferior in ability to members of other races. Since the Army is concerned only with individual soldiers as functioning members of military organizations, there is never any occasion to make such uncomplimentary references. When the training and assignment of Negro troops varies from that of white, the only sound justification is in the varying distribution of individuals in terms of educational levels, skills, and experience.

Many people who do not mean to be insulting use terms, tell jokes, and do things which are traditionally interpreted by Negroes as derogatory. Such words as “boy,” “Negress,” “darker,” “uncle,” “Mammy,” “auntie,” and “nigger” are generally disliked by Negroes. There is also dislike of the pronunciation of the word “Negro” as though it were spelled “Nigra,” because it seems to be a sort of genteel compromise between the hated word “nigger” and the preferred term “Negro.” Colored and Negro are the only words which should be used to distinguish colored soldiers from white. A safe rule on jokes is to avoid those which are dependent on the traditional ideas of the white man concerning Negro characteristics. Negroes may tell them among themselves, but resent the telling of such stories by white people. It is difficult, if not impossible, to characterize all behavior which is resented by Negroes, but perhaps the simplest, if too general, way to express it is to say that troop morale will suffer if the words or acts of officers imply either racial hostility or a patronizing, condescending attitude.

**LITTLE EXPECTED, LITTLE GAINED**

Officers who act on the theory that little can be expected of Negroes will naturally get little out of them. Colored soldiers are quick to learn whether their officers look on them as members of a childlike, mentally limited, primitive, or even vicious race, or whether the officer expects them to be good and useful troops. Colored commands have been known to take advantage of officers who showed that they expected nothing of them. The malingerer and trouble maker has a sure-fire technique in such situations. He need only act like the dullard his officer believes he is. Officers who are trying to do their best with colored troops should check their records to make sure that they are not using racial dogma as an excuse for their own failures as leaders.
It is easy to understand that Negroes do not like to be treated as racial inferiors. But many well-intentioned white people do not realize that many colored Americans prefer not to be credited with special, highly regarded talents.

The most common annoyance of this type is the emphasis upon supposedly inborn ability in music and dancing. Scientific studies have indicated that Negroes are not born with any special sense of rhythm, muscular control, ability to distinguish tones, or any other hereditary quality which might aid them to become outstanding in these arts. True, the American Negro group has developed original forms of both music and dancing, and there have been colored individuals who had great ability in both arts. The explanation, however, seems to lie in their history and life, not in their race.

A similar misunderstanding arises from the fact that there have been many outstanding Negro athletes. Negroes have been credited by some people with a physique that gives them an advantage in running, jumping, boxing, and a few other sports. This is also false. There is no evidence in biology, anatomy, psychology, or any other science to support the view that Negroes inherit any skeletal, muscular, nervous, or other physiological traits which fit them better than any other people for any activity. Such claims are far-fetched explanations for accomplishments which can be much more simply and directly explained by experience and training.

NEGRO ATTITUDES TOWARD RACIAL THEORIES

Negroes see in such theories, no matter how well meant, a tendency to place them in the position of a race apart. The basic desire of the group is to be considered ordinary people. Army officers have frequently gained the ill will of colored troops by arranging, with the best intentions in the world, recreation and entertainment which overplayed such supposed racial talents.

A good rule is not to ask colored troops to show off by doing the things at which white people think Negroes are especially talented as a race. Better still, let them decide for themselves, as far as possible, the kinds of recreation and entertainment in which they will take part. No doubt they will often select activities in which they are credited with superiority. The important point is that these should not be forced upon them. They should be encouraged to do what they want to, not just what some white people think they do best.

FACILITIES FOR NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS

The idea of racial segregation is disliked by almost all Negroes and downright hated by most. White people and Negroes, as a rule,
fail to have a common understanding of the meaning of segregation, and as a result have difficulty in even discussing the problems involved. To many white people who have come to accept the formula of “separate but equal facilities,” it seems that the protesting Negro is unreasonable, or that all that is lacking is something vaguely defined as “social equality.” The protesting Negro, on the other hand, knows from experience that separate facilities are rarely equal, and that too often racial segregation rests on a belief in racial inferiority.

The Army accepts no doctrine of racial superiority or inferiority. It may seem inconsistent, therefore, that there is nevertheless a general separation of colored and white troops on duty. It is important to understand that separate organization is a matter of practical military expediency, and not an endorsement of beliefs in racial distinction.

There must be as little friction within an army as possible. A 1943 survey of attitudes of white and colored soldiers gives us some basis for judging whether there would be increased friction if the existing degrees of separation were materially reduced. The following chart summarizes the replies of white and Negro enlisted men to three questions on this subject.

*Question:* “Do you think white and Negro soldiers should be in separate outfits or should they be together in the same outfits?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Separate outfits”</th>
<th>“No preference or undecided”</th>
<th>“Same outfits”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEGRO</strong></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WHITE</strong></td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Question:* “Do you think it is a good idea or a poor idea for white and Negro soldiers to have separate P. X.’s in Army camps?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Good idea”</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>“Poor idea”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEGRO</strong></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WHITE</strong></td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All other answers
Question: "Do you think it is a good idea or a poor idea to have separate service clubs in Army camps?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent saying:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Good idea&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEGRO</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chart may be surprising, in view of the statement made earlier that almost all Negroes dislike segregation. The number of Negroes who said they thought white and Negro soldiers should be in the same outfit was about as large as the group saying they should be in separate outfits, while a quarter of the men were undecided. The explanation is that the men were not asked whether they liked or disliked the idea of separate outfits. They were given a practical question about an immediate problem, not a question about an ideal situation in an ideal world. Men's written statements on why they favored separate outfits showed that they opposed segregation in principle, but also desired to avoid friction. On the other hand, many of the men who opposed separation in the Army thought such a policy inconsistent with the aims for which the Nation is fighting.

White soldiers, by a great majority, favored racial separation in the Army. This held true for both Northerners and Southerners. However sound their reasons may or may not be, this mass sentiment cannot be ignored.

These findings must not be taken to mean that white and colored soldiers dislike each other so much that they should never be allowed to come in contact with each other, or that there is certain to be trouble at a mixed post. There is a great body of evidence to the contrary. What the findings do indicate is no more and no less than that the odds are very much in favor of less interracial friction if colored and white enlisted men continue to be organized in separate military units.

War Department instructions provide that post exchanges and theaters, or sections of theaters, and other recreational facilities may be designated for the use of particular military units, but not for the use of a certain race or color group. Existing instructions make it clear, moreover, that it is not the policy of the War Department to require racial separation in off-duty activities. The burden of deciding whether or not there shall be some separation in the use of camp facilities is placed on the local command, with the assumption that local conditions will be taken into account. There is added the specific ban on use of resented reference to race or color.
LOCATION OF TRAINING CENTERS

The location of his unit presents special problems to the commander of Negro troops. In the 1943 survey, the majority of Negroes, Southerners as well as Northerners, said they preferred to be stationed in the North. Among Southern Negroes, 35 percent preferred a Southern station, while only 2 percent of the Northern Negroes wanted to be in the South.

Since the beginning of preparations for the war, many persons concerned with race relations have expressed regret that the Army decided to carry on a large proportion of its military training in the South. The general argument has been that such a policy greatly restricted the off-duty activities of Negroes and was especially hard on those who entered the Army from the North. In addition, it was felt that the policy would tend to spread Southern patterns of Negro-white relations to white Northerners serving in the South.

There may be much truth to these contentions, but the War Department came to the conclusion that matters of efficiency and timesaving in a national emergency outweighed the costs in interracial terms. The fact that the great majority of Negro enlisted men would prefer a reversal of this policy is a compelling reason for care on the part of officers that the morale of their men does not needlessly suffer as a consequence of Army policy.

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation facilities, both local and long distance, are overtaxed in general and seriously inadequate in many localities. Where segregation on public conveyances is required by law, travel is likely to be especially difficult for colored soldiers. Negroes are more likely than white enlisted men to complain about local bus service. This is demonstrated by the following chart, based on data from the 1943 survey.

ATTITUDES TOWARD BUS SERVICE

Question: "How do you feel about the bus service to and from camp for soldiers in your outfit?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>&quot;Very poor&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Poor&quot;</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>&quot;Fairly good&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Very good&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro...</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White...</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Complaints of this sort refer to local conditions, and local military authorities are in a position to investigate and to take action when
action is justified. It may be possible to secure better cooperation and planning of service by the bus companies. Military police may be assigned to troublesome routes, not only to enforce good behavior of the troops, but also to protect them from unwarranted discrimination. Staggering of passes and furloughs may be increased. Army equipment may possibly be used under special circumstances when there is an acute shortage of private conveyances. Local transportation is a definite responsibility of the local commander.

Long-distance travel problems are less easily solved by local authorities. When such problems have serious effects upon morale, they should be reported through proper channels.

POLICE PROBLEMS

Another local problem with which the commander may have to deal is that of the police. A long and widespread tradition that both civilian and military police are not impartial is an obstacle that must be overcome to insure the best behavior and the proper disciplining of Negro soldiers. The following chart shows Negro and white responses to questions about the fairness of M. P.'s.

Questions: “Do you think M. P.'s usually treat soldiers fairly or unfairly?” (Asked of white soldiers.)

“Do you think white M. P.'s usually treat Negro soldiers fairly or unfairly?” (Asked of Negroes. They were asked the same question about Negro M. P.'s.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude toward white M. P.'s</th>
<th>About half fair, half not</th>
<th>Usually not fair</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward Negro M. P.'s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>18% 5% 36% 46%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey made no attempt to get information to support or disprove the widespread belief in M. P. unfairness to Negroes. Regardless of its truth or falsity, this belief indicates that soldier-M. P. relations are a potential source of danger to be watched with great care. The fact that more colored soldiers believed that Negro M. P.'s were fair than had confidence in white M. P.’s, indicates that the use of Negro M. P.'s is desirable whenever it is feasible.

About the same proportion of Negro enlisted men had confidence in the fairness of town police as believed the white M. P.’s to be fair. Complaints about both town police and M. P.’s were most frequent among Negroes stationed in the South. But even in the North, Negroes
were more likely to be critical of police than were similarly selected groups of white soldiers. The majority of white soldiers, whether stationed in the North or South, say that town police usually treat soldiers fairly.

There is nothing to be gained by reviving the old arguments about whether Negroes get the same treatment at the hands of the law as white people. The Army’s concern is that the simple rights of all men wearing the uniform be respected, not only by police but by all civilian authorities and private citizens as well.

There is no desire to obtain special consideration for the soldier, white or colored, who breaks the law or is reasonably suspected of breaking it. There is, however, no excuse for the officer who allows his men to be maltreated without the most strenuous legitimate effort to provide them with protection. The officer who fails to act, through fear of community disapproval, when the welfare of even a single one of his men is involved, risks losing the confidence and loyalty of his unit.

It will be of benefit to the morale of Negro troops if they understand that in time of war the military authorities have the paramount right to the custody of a member of the military service charged with an offense under the civil law, and that it is War Department policy that in all ordinary cases the military authorities should try all members of the military service for all offenses alleged to have been committed by them. There is provision for exceptions to this policy, but it may be noted that no military personnel will be turned over to civil authorities by commanders of units or installations without first informing the commanding general of the appropriate service command. When a member of the military service is arrested by civil authorities it is anticipated that military authorities will be notified promptly, that he will not be unnecessarily detained, and that he will be surrendered on request to the proper military authorities for disposition of charges against him. This policy is amplified in Army Regulations 600-355, Changes No. 1, 27 August 1943.

Responsibility for the proper treatment of Negro military personnel is always on the shoulders of the commanding officers. It is their duty to make certain that colored officers and men under their command are not treated unjustly or discourteously because of their race, and that white personnel show others the respect and justice becoming to the uniform of our Army. Every effort should be made to instill and enforce principles of mutual respect, courtesy, and cooperation between Negro and white soldiers.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND THE PRESS

The problems of relations between Negro soldiers and civilian communities adjacent to their stations is a matter of military importance and is the responsibility of the post, camp, or station commander. The
highest morale cannot be built among troops which have inadequate and unhappy civilian relationships. Effective commanding officers have repeatedly demonstrated that much can be done to afford protection, not only against discriminating police and local authorities, but also against racketeering and morale-destroying indifference to recreational and other needs of soldiers. Most communities have a real desire to cooperate with military authorities in safeguarding soldiers' interests, and even in the least cooperative communities there are responsible citizens who deplore mistreatment of soldiers, regardless of race. Commanding officers should take advantage of such sources of assistance in protecting the welfare of their personnel in their civilian contacts.

Negro morale, both military and civilian, as well as Negro willingness to cooperate with the Army, has been found to be closely related to the quantity and type of military news made available to the Negro press and to the public generally. Negro newspapers are often severely critical of the Army, but they never fail to print favorable material when they can get it. Experience proves that a substantial flow of good releases about Negro participation in the war reduces the critical content of the colored press. The most widely used materials issued to the press have been those concerned with achievements of Negroes in training, with participation in combat, and with recognition of colored units or individual soldiers for the praiseworthy completion of tasks in which anyone, white or colored, might take pride.

Commanding officers should see that their public relations officers make available as much positive information about colored troops as they can find, and that they adapt this material to the needs of both the white and colored press. The guiding principle in all releases should be this: Negroes very much prefer to be considered ordinary people like all others, rather than as quaint, peculiar, or curious characters. Material on Negroes should not present them in a light which a white man would consider unseemly for himself.

Many white officers believe that Negro newspapers and other publications prepared for Negro readers are a main source of low morale among their men. This is a doubtful assumption, but whether it is true or false, the thing to do is to make good news available to these publications. It is equally important that the facts of unfavorable incidents such as riots, crimes, etc., be given to the press as soon as they are available. If censorship were desired it would not be effective, and a delay in making known such facts results in the publication of exaggerated or false statements which are unfair or harmful to the Army. Effort should be made to see that the truth is made known as promptly as possible.
RUMORS

Investigation has shown that every case of serious interracial trouble has been fed by rumors, and that these rumors are never accurate. Colored soldiers have been angered into mob action by stories of mistreatment. White soldiers have been similarly goaded by distorted and utterly false tales about Negro behavior. The antidote for such inflammatory rumors is to be found neither in oppressive censorship nor in overzealous repressive discipline. Malicious rumors should be met squarely with the truth so stated that it cannot be misunderstood, ignored, or doubted. This should be done as quickly as possible, just as soon as the responsible officer learns that dangerous tales are circulating or that there is a focus of dissatisfaction among his men. Individual circumstances will dictate whether such dangers are to be met by formal official statements, by less formal group discussions led by commissioned or noncommissioned officers, or by military intelligence procedures.

CONCLUSION

The War Department desires that Negro soldiers be used in the most effective manner. It intends that men of all races and national origins be encouraged and stimulated to do anything done by members of any other group in accordance with their individual abilities. The accomplishment of this purpose involves problems that are as technical as any other problem of personnel, and can be solved only with the benefit of special study, full information, a willingness to ask questions and try experiments, and a serious interest in finding adequate and reasonable solutions.
CHECK LIST

1. Have I made due allowances for any lack of educational opportunity in my men?
2. Have I made proper effort to teach my men skills they have not previously had opportunity to acquire?
3. Have I provided literacy classes for those needing them?
4. Have I used words and phrases that my men cannot fully comprehend?
5. Have I taken great pains with AGCT IV's and V's to explain to them the consequences of AWOL and venereal disease?
6. Have I provided the most intelligent and responsible soldiers with a good chance to earn promotion and to use their best abilities, even at the expense of having them transferred from my command?
7. Have I done or said things that might wound the sensibilities of my men?
8. Have I protected the rights of my men in their relations with other troops and with the public?
9. Have I required of my troops soldierly discipline, appearance, and conduct in their relations with the public?
10. Have I provided my public relations officer with as many items as possible relating to commendable performances by my outfit and individual soldiers in it?
11. Have I exacted the highest degree of discipline, care of equipment, care of grounds and buildings, etc., while making allowances for limitations on ability to perform where lack of education and mechanical skills may be a handicap?
12. Have I given my organization the opportunity to acquire pride and confidence in itself by giving it missions for which my men show superior qualifications?
13. Have I excused my own shortcomings as a commander by attributing inadequate training to lack of ability on the part of my command instead of to my own failure to correct shortcomings?
14. Have I constantly kept before my men the reasons why we fight?
15. Have I subordinated all else to my duties as a commander, and have my men been brought to realize the paramount place of the war effort?
October 14, 1944

My dear Mr. White:

I have read with much interest your letter to me of October 5, 1944, advising of the concern among Negro servicemen of the kind of life to which they will return after the war.

I share with you the thought that in our administration of laws respecting benefits for our veterans there must be assurance of equality of opportunity without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin, and that the administration of the important Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (the so-called "G. I. Bill of Rights") should be definitely at that level.

I note your correspondence with General Frank T. Hines, Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, concerning your recommendation that there be included in the personnel of the Veterans Administration a qualified Negro as Assistant Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, in order that a representative of your race should serve the Veterans Administration and the United States as a policy-making and policy-executing executive.

Realizing the importance of this issue to your Association and to the colored race, I feel I can give every assurance that General Hines in his administration will see to it that there is no discrimination against any race, creed, or color and will not hesitate, should the circumstances warrant, to meet with you on this subject and to take that action which will recognize the splendid service being rendered our country by those of your race who are in its armed forces.

Would it not be well in the further development of your thought in this regard and your interests, that you arrange to meet with General Hines in order that a full discussion may be had.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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New York 3, N. Y.