S E C R E T
b. Air
Air operations in CHINA will require additional aircraft
as shown in paragraph 19 a above.
Air deployments to SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (2579
aircraft), January 1, 1944, have been made in accordance with
requests for forces by the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC, to
perform tasks assigned, exclusive of capture of RABAUL.
It is entirely possible that attrition of Japanese
aircraft during the preliminary phases of operations under
way will permit the taking of RABAUL and completion of sub-
sequent operations in NEW GUINEA, with the forces allocated.
However, for planning purposes, and assmuing JAPAN has not
been evicted from the CAROLINES, it is estimated that for
operations to complete the capture of NEW GUINEA, including
defense forces, 3048 aircraft will be required. This indicates
a shortage of 469 aircraft as of January 1, 1944.
There will be sufficient land-based aircraft available
to CINCPAC for the operations in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES
during 1944.
c. Naval
It is concluded that there are not sufficient naval forces
to carry on a major operation in the central PACIFIC and a major
operation in the SOUTH PACIFIC simultaneously during 1943-44.
Preceding discussions of the naval requirements for individual
operations make it apparent that consideration must be given to
the sequence of assigned tasks.
d. Logistics
The logistical implications for supworting major opera-
tions such as those in NEW GUINEA or the CAROLINES have not
been assessed in this paper, among these implications would be
the shipping required to support the additional ground, air, and
naval forces moved to the theater. Furthermore, as the forces
advance there will be increasing demands for cargo shipping due
to the extension of the line of communications, such as from
from RABAUL to NEW GUINEA.
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