compared and summarized in Annex H. From the results of the comparison and the analusis made
it is apparent that:
 
(a) The two alternative premises in the Pacific have
 
a relatively small difference in effect on the forces
 
available for the European Theater.
 
(b) Under either premise the force available for the
 
European Theater is not adequate immediately for a major offensive.
 
(c) Under either premise the forces available for the
 
European Theater will be adequate to assist effectively
 
in such an offonsivo in the fa11 of 1942 and can be progressively increased. Their prospective 
 
availability should enable the British to initiate an offensive even
 
sooner.
 
12. The following general courses of action are recommended for
 
the fighting forces of the United States:
 
(a) Make secure the territory of North and South America
 
and their coastal communications.
 
(b) In cooperation with the forces of the British Common-
 
wealth make secure the trans-Atlantic sea and air routes.
 
(c) Secure Australia, the island positions between Aus-
                
tralia and Hawaii, and their sea and air commtmications with
 
the United States.
 
(d) Exert pressure against the Japanese by operations of
 
naval and air forces based in the mid Pacific and in the
 
Anzac area, including attack on vital Japaness sea communi
 
cations and exposed positions, and attack on Japanese naval 
 
forces under conditions favorable to increasing our rel-
 
ative strength.
 
(e) Give limited air assistance to the defense of the India-Burma-China area.
 
(f) Having arranged for the accomplishment of the above
 
                         -6-