With reference to the diversion of reinforcements intended for the
Philippine Islands, GENERAL MARSHALL said,
"We do not have enough information
at this time from General MacArthur to make a decision on this matter.
However, we must not stand idle while waiting to know what he proposes.
Until we know what the local situation is, we can not cut off
reinforcements from him. We will know in 24 hours whether or not it is
a fast withdrawal and where it goes, and whether or not pursuit planes
can get to him."
 
               AIR MARSHAL PORTAL asked if General MacArthur has any
instructions relative to the disposal of airplanes if he can not
operate in the Philippine Islands. GENERAL ARNOLD replied that the
bombers are already operating from Australia. He further stated that it
must be assumed that the man on the ground will do the right thing. He
said that General MacArthur has a good airz officer who can be counted
on to dispose properly of the remaining pursuit planes.
 
               AIR MARSHAL PORTAL asked if General MacArthur would send
his pursuit to Singapore. He added further that it was difficult for
any man on the spot to make a decision relative to the disPOsal of his
own means~ that the decision should be made here by the .responsible
group.
 
         4.      UNIFIED COMMAND.-
 
                GENERAL MARSHALL then brought up the question of
command. He said, "I express these as my personal views and not those
as a result of consultation with the Navy or with my own War Plans
Division. As a result Of what I saw in France and from following our
own experience, I feel very strongly that the mostz imp0rtant
consideration is the question of unity of command~ The matters being
settled here are mere details which will continuously reoccur unless
settled in a broader way. With differences between groups and between
services, the situation is impossible unless we operate on a frank and
ldirect basis. I am convinced that there must be one man in command of
the entire theater ......             air, ground, and ships. We can
not manage by coopera'
tion. Human frailties are such that there would be emphat.ic
unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we
make a plan for unified command now, it will solve, ninestenths of our
troubles.
                "There are difficulties in arriving at a single
command) but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if
we do n Qt achieve this. We never think alike ~- there are the opinions
of those on this side of the table and of the people on the other side;
but as for myself)I am willing to go the limit to accomplish this. We
must decide on a line of action here and not expect it to be done out
there. I favor one man being in control~ but operating under a
controlled directire from here. We had to come to thJ. s in the first
World War, but it was not until 1918 that it was accomplished and much
valuable time) blood, and treasure had been needlessly sacrificed. If
we could decide on a Unified command now, it would be a great advance
over what was accomplished during the World War."
 
m 3 '~