Northwest Africa.
West Africa.
Northeast Brazil and the Cape Verde Islands.
Northern Ireland and Iceland.
                                                                            
 
The occupation of the Canaries (by invitation), the Azores, and of Aruba 
and Curacao, fell into the category of minor operations. Further consideration 
would have to be given to the status of the Madagascar operation.
 
                     It appeared that the British Chiefs of Staff understood that this 
report (see Annex 1), was accepted. However, the understanding of the United States 
Chiefs of Staff was that it was accepted in principle but should be restudied and resubmitted 
for further consideration.
 
2.        NORTHWEST AFRICA PROJECT
 
                 The British delegation was of the opinion that it would take German forces six 
weeks to prepare to invade Spain, and, without Spanish cooperation, a further six weeks to 
become firmly established in the South of Spain. It was pointed out that this estimate was 
based on the best information available to the British, and took account of the fact that the 
Germans at the present time hadno forces readily available to undertakethe operation. It was 
realized that with Spanish help the date of arrival in South Spain could be considerably 
accelerated.
 
                 ADMIRAL TURNER explained that the Joint Planning Committee felt that only 
Casablanca should be used, in the first instance, as the minor ports were difficult to 
protect from submarine attack and effective anti-air protection could only be given to 
one port. He pointed out that the size of the North African expedition as envisaged by 
the Joint Planning Committee was greatly in excess of anything previously considered, 
and the implications on shipping were therefore enormous. Was this increase in size 
essential - particularly with regard to air? The British view was that the German Air 
Force was already stretched almost to its limit. It was decided th'at consideration of 
the size of the forces required should be deferred.
 
                  It was also pointed out that one reason why large forces had to be 
envisaged was that the French authorities would in all probability only issue the 
invitation if the bait were, in their opinion, adequate. It was suggested that the 
French air force in North Africa might, in the early stages, prove of some value in 
spite of its known lack of spares, but GENERAL ARNOLD said that from a recent 
conversation he had had with a French officer who had recently left North Africa, 
he understood that only 40 of the French aircraft were capable of taking the air.
                                              -3-