-3-                             
 
 
If union with Danzig can thus be brought about there will be
 
a lull to allow Polish disappointmont - fostered by German propa-
 
ganda and diplomacy. - to dishearten the Polish people. German 
 
propaganda will dwell upon Poland's loss of prestige both among the
 
Poles thomselves and throughout the East and South East of Europe.
 
it wiil promote political disturbances in Poland so as to bring on
 
a change of Government at Warsaw, a reversal of the "Western tenden-
 
cy" of Polish foreign policy in favour of a German-Polish alliance.
 
Revolutionary and separatist movements will be organised in the
 
Polish Ukraine in order to compel any Warsaw Government to ask
 
Germany for a free hand in suppressing them.
 
 
Germany is unlikely to make new territorial demands on Poland
 
immediately after the occupation of Danzig. They will only be made 
 
when Poland has been forced out of the coalition with the Western 
 
Powers, and when the Warsaw Government has on its hands the rebel-
 
lious movements in tho Polish Ukraine. But after the diplomatic 
 
defeat of Poland in Danzig strong pressure will be put on the Baltic 
 
and Danubian States to seek "protection" by joining Germany or the 
 
Axis "voluntarily".
 
 
In this way Hitler expects to resume the policy, interrupted
 
in the Spring of 1939, of linking Poland with the Axis system and of 
 
extending this system to all other States between Germany and Russia.
 
 
                            IV.                             
 
 
Should Poland nevertheless fight for Danzig Hitler will not rely 
 
solely upon military action against hot.  Before union is proclaimed 
 
the main strength of the German army will be concentrated on the bor-
 
ders of Poland while tho "Siegfried Line" will bo defensively hold in 
 
the West.    A Polish attack would be answered by a Gorman counter-
 
attack with tho aim of crushing tho Polish army in tho region between 
 
Bromberg. (Bydgoszcz) and Posen.  This attack would turn the flanks 
 
of tho Polish army from East Prussia, Pomorania and Silesia, a "light-
 
ning" occupation of Upper Silesia being carried out simultaneously so 
 
as to cut away the chief centre of Polish industry.
 
 
This Hitler thinks, could be done in a few weeks.  Germany 
 
does not intend to pursue the Polos to Warsaw or beyond.  She in-
 
tends to offer Poland an "honourable peace" on the morrow of a crush-
 
ing defeat, and to exploit this offer by propaganda in Western Europe 
 
particularly.
 
 
Though Hitler still hopes that the Western Powers will be mili-
 
tarily inactive at the beginning of a German-Polish war, especially 
 
if Poland were the "aggressor", he fools the urgency of ending such 
 
a war quickly so as to leave tho Western Powers no opening for inter-
 
vention. A peace offer would influence the Polos themselves as well 
 
as the Western peoples in favour of "peace"; and if the West remains 
 
inactive the Poles will be told that they must come to terms with 
 
Germany before it is too late. In the event of a French attack 
 
upon Germany, its chances of success would bo belittled.
 
 
By an "honourable peace" Hitler understands the cession to
 
Germany of the "Corridor" as far as the line Schneidemuhl-Bromberg-
 
Thorn-Soldau, together with Upper Silesia and the formerly Austrian
 
art of Polish Silesia.    The rest of Polish territory would be 
 
"guaranteed". Poland would retain the town and port of Gdynia, toget-
 
her with a motor-road and a railway from Gdynia, through-German terri-
 
tory to the Polish Hinterland as well as a free harbour in Danzig and 
 
the greater part of Poznania.
 
 
To Western Europe those peace terms would be explained as
 
moderate and reasonable, seeing that they would only cost Poland be-
 
tween 6% and 7% of her present territory. But the possession of 
 
the whole "Corridor" would serve Germany as a guarantee of a perma-
 
nent economic and political alliance with Poland.    There would be