Sultan, we will have to have Nogues.But, if we mean business, and can 
 
prove it, we could have Nogues.
 
     As the State Department must remember, last December the Sultan put 
 
on a very special show for our Minister, Mr. White, and gave him many 
 
marks of respect and public reception, but, if I am correctly informed, 
 
our State Department, in its zeal to appease General Franco, has diminished 
 
our standing in Tangier by leaving the post of Minister vacant. (If any 
 
one has been sent recently, I don't know about it.)
 
     We have to make up our minds either to assert our rights in North 
 
Africa and showup in their defense, or to abdicate altogether. All of 
 
this situation, of course, is very well known in the State Department,
 
and they are better qualified than I to give a summary of treaty rights 
 
and to explain the historical importance of Northern Africa to us.
 
     We have not recognized General Franco's occupation of Tangier. We
 
did not have to, because we never recognized the special international 
 
status of Tangier which was set up after 1909. But we, and the British, 
 
have played up to Franco and, although we succeeded in getting him to 
 
remove some o‚ his artillery from Tangier, we have not done anything 
 
to make him get out. There is, of course, a great historical precedent 
 
for action in Morocco in defense of our treaty rights: Teddy Roosevelt's 
 
dispatch of the fleet to rescue art American "protege". In fact, the Moors
 
in Tangier remember only one hostile action in modern times, the bombard-
 
ment by Mr. Roosevelt's warships.
 
         We used to think the Mediterranean important enough to send our fleet 
 
to clean up the Barbary pirates on two occasions, and once to put Rai Suli 
 
in order.
 
     May I point out that Franco has troops, estimated between 120,000
 
and 200,000, which could be supported by German aviation from perfect bases
 
 
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