Nothing has ever been done to protect or benedict either the country or the people.
Self-determination of minority peoples is a doctrine noticeable in Kuomintang thinking for its
absence. The Generalissimo goes to great length in China's DESTINY to prove that the Mongols,
like the other minorities, a re actually a part of the Chinese race. It would
not be surprising,o therefore, to find that the Mongols, as the Tibetans and probably the
non-Chinese population of Sinkiang, hate and fear the Chinese and are determined to maintain
their independence.
(b) In regard to the Chinese Communist problem. The Kuomintang believes that the Chinese
Communists have been in the past, and may be again in the ture, supported by the Soviets. They
may consider that the firmness of Russian policy in Outer Mongolia can be taken as an indication
of Russian interest and aims with respect to the Communists.
(c) In regard to Russian plans in Sinking, in Manchuria, in China as a whole, and for eventual
participation in the Far Eastern war. It may be argued, for instance, that if Russia intends to take a
benevolent part in the war, if she does not intend to seek her own selfish interests, and if she
wants to have as her neighbor a strong, independent and friendly China (under the
Kuomintang),then she will support China's territorial integrity and not dispute Chinese claims to
actual - rather than theoretical - soverignty over such areas as Outer Mongolia.
3. Present Chinese leadership may wish to stipulate anti-Russian feeling, both in China
and abroad.
The Kuomintang government, and many other Chinese, fear Russia and regard her as a greater,
enemy certainly potentially - than Japan. With their traditional, and apparently unshakeable, habit
of playing off one party against another, these elements dislike evidences of closer British-Soviet-American understanding, and welcome signs of differences and disunity. They count for support
on the anti-Communist sentiments o‚ the controlling British con-
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