Chinese Communist understanding, of arrangements between the Communists and the Japanese
for a Communist corridor to Outer Mongolia., of fighting between the Communist and Central
Government forces in North Honan, and of shipments of Soviet arms to the Communists by air.
These stories come f'rom many sources, including the highest officials. But there is as yet no
evidence of thier havSng any basis in fact.
 
    It apparently has been a f avorite tactic of' the Chinese leaders during the past two or three
years, when they felt moral pressure to take some more positive part in the war, to seek refuge in
the excuse of a Japanese threat in some other quarter. The recent Sinktang developments can be
interpreted as a variant of this strategy.
 
              This explanation of the Sinktang situation as having direct Central Government
motivation may be considered too dogmatic. But it is hardly probable that Sheng Shih-tsai,
weakened by the withdrawal of' his former mainstay- Russian military forces and aviation, and
certainly preoccupied with themaintenance of his position in the face oi' growing Central
Government control, would independently, or even willingly, seek trouble for himself by
campaigning against the redoubtable Kaz aks and attempting to establish his frontier in areas
known to be disputed with Outer Mongolia. As mentioned in my memorandurn of March 22nd,
some well informed Chinese believe that Sheng was under direct orders from the Generalissimo to
create a military base in this area, strategic for possible future pressure on outer  Mongolia. The
fact cannot be denied that China, in the face of internal troubles and a stagnant War effort, is
showing an amazing concentration on peripheral problems-Tibet, Northwest development, the
status of Burma, and even the borders of Indo-China and Thailand. Also it cannot be denied that
China's relations with Russia have steadily deteriorated to a point of tension: There was bickering
and bad feeling over the withdrawal of Russian interest from Sinktang; the movement of Russian
planes and trucks in China has been practically stopped; Russian military advisors are no longer
welcomed or consulted; trade and barter are at a near standstill and Russia c!ai:s that the Chinese
have not lived up to their promises; attempted transport arrangements have so far been a failure;
Chinese feeling against Russia has 
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