become more outspoken; and as mentioned before, the Chinese lost no time in trying to exploit
the anti-Russian angles of the present incident.
 
               Crediting theChinese with at least a lack of concern over complicating their own and
their allies relations with Russia may also be objected to on the ground that China is anxious to
have Russia enter the war against Japan. I do not believe that such is actually the case. General
Chinese public opinion may desire to have Russia enter the war at an early date in the hope that
this will ensure the speedy defeat of Japan. But the Kuomintang's leaders, I suggest, give only lip
service to this idea. On the contrary, if they are as calculating as we must assume they are, they
will very much pre‚er to have Japan defeated by the United States, which they hope will continue
to be friendly to the Kuoraintang and opposed to the spread of Communist influence in China. By
the same reasoning, the Kuomintang dreads the active participation by Russia in the defeat of
Japan because this will give Russia art undeniable voice in Far Eastern affairs and will greatly
increase her prestige and the influence of Communism with the people of China. We can expect,
therefore, that as American strength in the Paci‚ic increases and our war against Japan progresses
favorably- as it is doing at present - the Chinese government will become more and more
anti-Russian.
 
              These may have been the Chinese motives in Sinkiang. What has been the Chinese
success?
 
              The pretext has been provided for sending large Central Government military forces into
Sinkiang. These may by force, overcome any unorganized local resistance and break up minority
groups such as the Kazaks inside of Sinking They should also ensure - perhaps after a period of
maneouver and face saving - the eventual removal of Sheng Shih-tsai and his replacement by a
nominee of the Central Government. They probably will not, however be able to establish the
disputed boundary claimed by China, because the ,Outer Mongols, even without direct Soviet
participation, appear to have an efficient and well equipped military force. There is also the danger
that Central Governmentmilitary control may prove a boomerang by provoking rebellion in
Sinkiang, either spontaneously from the resentment of the largely Mohammedon population, or
through Russian connivance and support of such
 
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