force would be ineffective. They consist of:
                    Ground:   25,700 troops.
                    Air:      41 obsolete aircraft.
                    Naval:         2 DD's.
 
8.   A peaceful utilization of the AZORES as sn air and naval base would be preferable to an
occupation by force. If peaceful negotiations should fail, preparations must be complete for an
immediate occupation by force.
 
9.   SPAIN'S reaction to either a peaceful or forced occupation of the AZORES would
probably be the same in either case reflecting apprehension for her position in the CANARY
ISLANDS and resulting in diplomatic protests.
 
10.  AXIS reaction to either a peaceful or forced occupation of the AZORES would probably
result in strong blasts of propaganda pointing to our violation of the precepts of the ATLANTIC
Charter.  The likelihood of air attacks on PORTUGAL and attacks on Portuguese shipping would
be less if the occupation were forced.
 
11.  PORTUGAL'S price for a peaceful entry to the AZORES might consist of requests for
additional economic aid, military supplies, and equipment, as well as protection by UNITED
NATIONS armed forces.  In the event of a forced occupation, she might seek reparation in terms
of such aid, supplies, and protection.  No full break with the UNITED NATIONS is anticipated.
 
12.  It is estimated that the following would be required for an occupation by force:
          Ground: 1 Division, Reinforced (Amphibiously trained).
          Air: 1 Carrier Group, 36 F and 36 DB
          Naval: 2 BB, 1 CV, 2 CA or CL, 23 DD, 15 APA, 5 AKA.
This force to effect landings on FAYAL and TERCEIRA ISLANDS simultaneously, and
subsequently to reduce SAN MIGUEL ISLAND.
 
13.  The advantages to be obtained in utilizing the AZORES as an air base from which to
combat the submarine menace, greatly outwelsh the disadvantages which would accure to their
occurcation.
 
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