ENCLOSURE "A"
                                
                 SEIZURE OR PEACEFUL OCCUPATION
                         OF THE AZORES
                                
                    STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
 
1. Anti-Submarine campaign.
 
     An important weapon in the anti-submarine campaign is the VLR aircraft. The operation
of this type of airplane from presently available bases should become highly effective late in the
summer of 1943, and force the U-boat to areas that are out of range of bases now at our disposal.
If the AZORES could be used as a base for VLR aircraft, the UNITED STATES-UNITED
KINGDOM convoys could be re-routed through areas with more desirable flying weather, thus
obtaining improved coverage.  The UNITED STATES-NORTH AFRICA, and
TRINIDAD-UNITED KINGDOM convoys could also follow routes along which they would
receive complete cover. (See ApDendix "A"). A considerable time would be required to place the
AZORES bases in full operation after they are obtained. Therefore, early action is necessary if
these bases are to be used during the critical periods in 1943.
 
2. Use of AZORES as aircraft ferrying staging point.
 
     The possible use of air base facilities in the AZORES as a staging point for ferrying of
long range aircraft to the UNITED KINGDOM, NORTH AFRICA, INDIA, and the FAR EAST
should be borne in mind. The following comparative distances aresignificant:
 
 
MIAMI-NATAL-CASABLANCA                       7,213 statute miles
NEW YORK-BOTWOOD-AZORES-CASABLANCA      3,881 statute miles
 
- a saving of 46%.
 
 
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