"Nor can we give our assent to appellants' contention that the war was terminated by the oint resolution of Congress, passed July 2, 1921, 42 Stat. at L. 105, Sec. 1). A state of war cannot be terminated by a mere declaration by one of the belligerents that there is no longer any reason for its continuation. The actual termination of a war is a mutual matter evidenced by a treaty, duly ratified by both parties, and it cannot properly be said that a war has ended until the ratifications have been exchanged. True, the section of the Trading with the Enemy Act which we have quoted, after fixing 'the date of proclamation of exchange of ratifications' as the 'end of the war' added 'unless the President shall by proclamation declare a prior date.' This seems to contemplate, for the purposes of that act, the possibility of a proclamation declaring the war ended prior to the exchange of ratifications. No such proclamation was made. The only proclamation was that of November 14, 1921, reciting the exchange of ratifications and declaring the war to have terminated on July 2, 1921. We are not persuaded that this proclamation should be given the retroactive effect contended for; to do so would be equivalent to saying that a right of action, to which the statute would have been a bar within a few days after the end of the war, may, by a proclamation made three days later, be set back more than four months, with the effect that it could never be enforced." (96 Pa. Superior Ct. ns, 124 (1929).) In the case of Kotzias v. Tyser, the Court of King's Bench held - "the authorities show that, in the absence of any specific statutory or contractual provi- sion to the contrary, the general rule of international law is that as between civilized Powers who have been at war, peace is not con- cluded until a treaty of Peace is finally bind- ing upon the belligerents, and that that stage is not reached until ratifications of the treaty of peace have been exchanged between them." 1920 2 K.B. 69, 77. Furthermore, |