Furthermore, whatever may be said of the effect of the Joint Resolution of July 2, 1921, it
is to be borne in mind that it was the joint act of the Congress and the President. If in the present
situation Congress should pass a resolution with the President' s commitment regarding hostilities
still outstanding, he could veto it as President Wilson did in 1920 and it would not become
operative even domestically unless passed over his veto.
 
            The only way by which Congress could compel the President to "cease hostilities" would
be by cutting off the appropriations. Even in such a situation he could do as President Theodore
Roosevelt is said to have threatened to do when the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval
Affairs reportedly announced that Congress would refuse to appropriate money to send the fleet
around the world. In referring to the incident he stated:
 
                      "...However, I announced in response
              that I had'enough money to take the fleet around
              to the Pacific anyhow, that the fleet would cer-
              tainly go, and that if Congress did not choose
              to appropriate enough money to get the fleet back,
              why, it would stay in the Pacific. There was no
              further difficulty, about the money." (Roosevelt,
              An Autobiography (1913) 592, 598.)
 
              The resolutions of Congress declaring the existence of a state of war between the United
States and Japan, Germany and Italy pledge "all of the resources of the country" to bring the
conflict to "a successful termination".
 
                                                           Both