SUPER GYMNAST
 
 
POLICY..
 
1.    London defines the circumstances which are sine qua non to the whole-plan as "a guarantee
of no opposition by the Vichy French Fleet together with full information regarding all minefields
laid in the approaches to French African ports". They add that it is also most desirable that all
French warships-shall have moved from Casablanca before the arrival of the first convoy so that
all berths in the harbour may be clear.
 
SCALE OF AIR ATTACK.
 
 
2    The British Joint Intelligence Committee's view  is that there is no imminent threat of air
attack' on Casablanca in the postulated circumstances. That even operating through Spain it is
improbable that the German scale of effort would exceed 30 long rangebombers by the end of the
first month, although thereafter it might be built up more rapidly.
 
3.  German and Italian air forces could to-day attack Tunisia. Scales of effort are estimated as
follows:
 
          German - 350 aircraft (of which 180 bombers)
          Italian -  180 aircraft (of which 50 bombers
                                    based on Sicily)
 
          A possibility of a further 130 Italian fighters based on Tripoli (Libya).
 
4.    The view in London is that the enemy's air attack from Spain would almost certainly be
directed against the Algerian ports before reaching out as far as Casablanca.
If this be so, there is little immediate threat to Casablanca when a British contingent is
disembarked in Algeria.
 
EMPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES.
 
5.    General Alexander has expressed the view that the British air forces in Tunisia are
inadequate. It is appreciated that General Fredendall, the Supreme Commander,  has not been able
to see his way to accepting the suggestion that certain U.S. air forces be allocated to General
Alexander. However, having regard,  to the arguments put forward above as to the probable scale
of air attack on Casablanca, it is thought that General Fredendall may be willing to reconsider the
practicability of making some U.S. pursuit air forces available to the British in Tunisia or Algeria,
after settinge up  his squadrons in the Casablanca area.
 
 
 
PORT CAPACITY.
 
6.    Casablanca cannot accommodate 55 ships.  Detailed examination has been made which shows
that we must reduce our previous estimates. A detailed appreciation by the British Joint Planners
in London is as follows:-
 
         (a) As it is felt that 1/3 of the accommodation of the port must be allowed for French
requirements, even during the unloading of the first convoy, it is estimated that a maximum of    
14 M.T. storeships, 2 petrol ships, 1 fleet of oilers and 1 group of escorts can be accommodated
inside the boom defence.    4 of these M.T. storeships must be loaded with coal or other bulk
cargo, so that they can be dealt with at the coaling quay, and the remainder must not. contain
more than 25,000 tons dead weight stores if they.
 
                           DECLASSIFIED                 
                           J C S Regrading Memo 31- 71
                          By RT   Dae APR , 5 1973