are to be unloaded in a 16 day cycle. It would be .possible to unload 6 more ships artificially
flatted and loaded only with M.T. provided the personnel were accommuodated either at satellite
ports such as Safi, or in the outer harbour in the area marked "prohibited anchorage" which is
probably a controlled minefield area. This is still under investigation.
 
       (b) Transit capacity is 4,000 tons a day.    Allowing 1300 tons a day for French requirements
this gives us 2700 tons per day.    These figures (i.e. 25,000 tons stores, 10,000 tons coal, chiefly
for French Railways, and 4,000 tons petrol) give an average of 2500 tons per day over a 16 day
cycle. The allowance for building up reserves will therefore be small.
 
       (c) The capacity of Casablanca each 16 day period is thus estimated at 25,000 tons stores,
10,000 tons coal, 4,000 tons petrol  and 3,000 vehicles. The vehicle figures must
be reduced to 2,100 if 6 extra M.T. ships cannot be accommodated.    3,000 vehicles are sufficient
for about 8 personnel ships carrying up to 2,000 British troops in each 16 day cycle; and it is
proposed to plan on this basis. Personnel convoys should arrive 4 days before M.T. stores
convoys.
 
A/A .DEFENCE.
 
7. It is pointed out that the number of heavy A/A guns in the A/A regiment detailed for the first
convoy is 24, To add more will probably be difficult as it would involve another ship.
 
CONVOY PROGRAMME.
             
8. A revised convoy programme appears to be essential. General Alexander suggests that the
British contingent should be maintained through Oran as long as possible so as to reduce the
strain on Casablanca. This must however be subject to the proviso that all Allied Forces landed in
Africa must be capable of being maintained through Casablanca should the Germans enter Spain.
The British convoy programme to Oan is therefore dependent upon the British programme to
Casablanca.
 
9. B-1 cannot now sail before D-24 owing to the release of shipping previously held in readiness.
The fast portion of the British contingent, including at least two M.T. ships, cannot arrive before
D-34, while the slow portion cannot arrive before D-38. London agrees that the first Casablanca
convoy should be joint American-British, but they doubt the wisdom of planning to meet at sea.
 
10. The minimum British requirement for carrying A/A and the necessary administrative units is
estimated at 4 personnel and 5 M.T. ships. Thereafter alternative British and American convoys
are proposed - in that order and at 18 day intervals. British convoys to Oran will conform as long
as the port can be used. Should the use of Oran be suddenly denied, any convoy which is en route
will be diverted to safe anchorage until Casablanca can receive it.
 
ll. Attached hereto (Annex l) is a revised convoy programme based on the 16 day cycle referred to
above.
 
DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVE.
 
12. It also seems desirable to confirm that there is identity of view as regards objective. The
objective was agreed in Para. 2, ABC-4/2 WW(J.P.C.)2 by the Joint Planning Committee as
follows:-
 
            "We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as
quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at
short notice and thus block Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a
base from which Allied control co~ld be extended over all North Africa and into Europe"