Text Version


CANARIES AND PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS.
 
        7. A'German invasion of Spain will lead to the immediate denial
of Gibraltar as a Naval Base and in all probability the inVoIvement of
Portugal as well as Spain in the war. In those circumstances, it w. ill
be essential to secure the Canaries as a N~val Base. It is possible
that the Spaniards would themselves offer us facilities in these
islands. On the other'hand, the Spaniards may oppose our occupation of
the Canaries. While a Spanish offer of facilities would eliminate the
need for a large occupying force, ,it would
be necessary to provide sufficient additional air and an~i-aircraft
defenses to meet the threat of German air forces based on the mainland
of Africa, as well as harbor protection for the Naval Base, and for an
air patrol of the sea.
 
         8. If we have gained an entry into French North Africa and the
Spaniards subsequently acquiesce in a 6erinart move into Spain, we
could not at the same ~ime undertake an operation to capture the
Canaries.
 
         9.    If the opportunity to carry out North Africa operations
does not occur., and the Germans move into Spain with Spanish
acquiescence~ the capture of the Cana nies, even against opposition,
and the occupation of the Azores and ,Cape Verdes will become
essential.
 
       10.    It has been agreed that the responsibility for the
occupation of the Canaries is a Brl~ish one~ but it would probably be
necessary to obtain N~val assistance from the United States. A British
assaulting force is already earmarked for this operation and should~ we
consider, be kept in being.
 
       ll.    Occupation of the Cape Verdes has been accepted as a
United States responsibility. A portion of the United States Army
forces set up for North Africa would be used for this operation. The
necessary naval support would
z h~ve to be prOv. ided by United States Naval .Forces.
 
       12.    In the event of a German move .into the Iberian
Peninsula, .it is almost certain that Portugal will admit British
forces into the Azores, and probably Madeira. .For the security of
these islands the chief requirement will 'be air and anti-aircraft
defenses and'harbor protection. ~'The prOv. ision of these forces is a
British responsibility and the .necessary forces should
be earmarked. Considerable diffficulty, however, will be found'in prOv.
iding ,the shipping for this operation simultaneously with that for
North Afnica or
the Canaries.
 
       13.    If the move of British forces to the Azores becomes
possible~ we are of the opinion that the United States should occupy
the Cape 'Verdes in order to make certain that these islands are denied
to the enemy and secured for future use. The occupation of the Cape
Verdes will be of considerable
 
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