importance if we do not succeed in gaining elltry into French North
Africa and are compelled to undertake operations in French West Africa
at a later date.
 
OCCUPATION OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA
 
       14.    If we fail to occupy North Africa and Axis occupation
appears imminent, then the capture of French West Africa will be
essential. If we do not obtain French cooperation in French North
Africa~ it is unlikely that we shall gain free entryinto Dakar. It is
therefore necessary to plan the capture ofDakar against opposition.
With the joint resources available it is not, in our opinion~ possible
to undertake an operation of this nature until the lateAutumn of 1942
when the weather conditions become favorable. It has been agreed that
the United States should be responsible for this operation and we
suggest that the planning and training should be put in hand. We
propose for consideration that as a preliminary~ and simultaneously
with the occupation of the Cape erdes~ United States Air and other
appropriate forces should be moved to the :Freetown- Bathurst area.
Their presence in this area will increase the security of the
Trans-African Reinforcement Route and the naval base at Freetown.
 
NORTHEAST BRAZIL
 
15.    The security of Northeast _Brazil is of strategic importance as
a link in the communications between ~nnerica and the Trans-African
reinforcement route. Germany established in West Africa immediately
becomes a threat to the South American Continent~ in addition to the
threat to Atlantic sea communications. The danger of an Axis-inspired
uprising in ~,razil, which would interrupt the air route through Africa
to the Middle and Far East cannot be dis--
regarded. The operation is a United States responsibility.
Plans have been
prepared and formations set up for this task.
 
DIEGO SUAREZ
 
       16. Although the denial of the naval base of Diego Suarez to the
enemy isof considerable strategic importance, no British force will be
available to undertake this operation within the periodunder
consideration if the force forthe Canaries operation is kept in being.
Moreover~ if this operation were carried out in the near future it
might prejudice our chance of obtaining French collaboration in North
Africa. We are therefore of the opinion that we can not hold a force
ready to undertake this operation at present.
 
17.    We therefore recommendthat:
 
            ~ The movement of United States Army and Air forces to
Iceland, Ireland~ and the United Kingdom should proceed as
expeditiously as possible.
 
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