action involves a timely reduction rather than an increase in
 
allied resources committed to that area, tends to support SICKLE, and does not interfere with 
 
ROUNDUP.
 
        V. Subject to discussion and future developments, the occupa-
 
tion of SARDINIA is considered less open to objection than other
 
Mediterranean operations.
 
       VI. The United States will not become involved in operations
 
east of Sicily except possibly for special air operations.
 
      VII. If the British insist on doing so, they do it alone.
 
      VIII. Should the British insist on undertaking commitments in the
 
Mediterranean, which the United States considers prejudicial to
 
the over-all concept of the earliest possible defeat of Germany
 
and the ultimate defeat of Japan, the British will be informed
 
that the United States may be forced to revise their strategy and 
 
extend their operations and commitments in the Pacific.
 
JAPAN
 
IX.  ANAKIM should be undertaken and pressed to successful conclusion.
 
X. If ANAKIM proves impossible, due to lack of British support
 
or other reasons, and no adequate alternative can be agreed upon, 
 
the United States will expand and intensify its operations in
 
the Pacific, in order to counteract the advantage which Japan gains
 
 by Allied failure adequately to support China.
 
 
                         DISCUSSION
 
2. The main subjects of the agenda proposed by the British are:
 
a. "Post-HUSKY strategy in 1943 against Axis in Europe under
 
following heads:
      
   Further action in Mediterranean                              
       
  S I CKLE and BOLERO"                                        
 
b. "Action against Japan in Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters."