action involves a timely reduction rather than an increase in allied resources committed to that area, tends to support SICKLE, and does not interfere with ROUNDUP. V. Subject to discussion and future developments, the occupa- tion of SARDINIA is considered less open to objection than other Mediterranean operations. VI. The United States will not become involved in operations east of Sicily except possibly for special air operations. VII. If the British insist on doing so, they do it alone. VIII. Should the British insist on undertaking commitments in the Mediterranean, which the United States considers prejudicial to the over-all concept of the earliest possible defeat of Germany and the ultimate defeat of Japan, the British will be informed that the United States may be forced to revise their strategy and extend their operations and commitments in the Pacific. JAPAN IX. ANAKIM should be undertaken and pressed to successful conclusion. X. If ANAKIM proves impossible, due to lack of British support or other reasons, and no adequate alternative can be agreed upon, the United States will expand and intensify its operations in the Pacific, in order to counteract the advantage which Japan gains by Allied failure adequately to support China. DISCUSSION 2. The main subjects of the agenda proposed by the British are: a. "Post-HUSKY strategy in 1943 against Axis in Europe under following heads: Further action in Mediterranean S I CKLE and BOLERO" b. "Action against Japan in Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters." |