While these Subjects are in general satisfactory, the
 
limiting phrase "in 1943," in item (a) is typical of the British
 
 tendency to the immediate and short view, in contrast to our
 
belief that agreed undertakings must be based on the over-all or
 
long view. We should see that the words "in 1943" are omitted
 
from the approved agenda, and that it is changed to read "SICKLE,
 
BOLERO and ROUND-UP."
 
    3. The close interrelation between the two principal subjects
 
 the war in Europe and the war against Japan, should be emphasized
 
 in discussing the agenda. Our position should be that, while at the
 
 present time we accept a strategy which contemplates the
 
defeat of Germany first, we maintain that any proposed course of
 
action against Germany has a direct relation to cur proposed
 
course of action against Japan.
 
       4. After these two points concerning the agenda have been
 
decided, the subject of "Further action in Mediterranean" will
 
come up. It appears that the crux of this question will be whether 
 
or not the Allied Nations shall be committed to major operations in
 
 the Eastern Mediterranean. We should state that
 
such a commitment is contrary to sound strategy and should firmly
 
maintain that the United States will not become so committed.
 
     a. Such action does not offer adequate contribution to
 
the basic concept of the earliest possible defeat of the Axis
 
in Europe.
 
      b. It will absorb means that are needed for SICKLE,.
 
ROUNDUP, and the war against Japan.
 
     c. It will involve longer and more hazardous lines of corn-
 
munication and the application of our effort in an area remote
 
from and having substantially no communications leading to
 
the decisive theater of the war.
 
                                      -8-